it was not only grant who tried l's patience during these unusually hot, depressing summer months of 1864. usually he was ready to spend countless hours listening to visitors who brought him their complaints and petitions, sometimes over quite trivial matters, but now he had had enough. when two citizens of maine asked him to intervene to settle a personal problem, the president sharply responded: you want me to end your suspense? i'll do so. dont let me hear another word about your case'. a few days later his anger erupted again when charles gibson resigned as solicitor in the court of claims, protesting the radicalism of the republican platform but expressing gratitude to the president for treating him with 'personal kindness and consideration'. with what bates called 'blind impetuosity' l lashed back that there were '2 small draw-backs upon mr. gibson's right to still receive such treatment, one of which is that he never could learn of his giving much attention to the duties of his office, and the other is this studied attempt of mr. gibson's to stab him'.
in calmer times l would have ignored a semi literate communication form a pennsylvania man who urged him to remember that 'white men is in class number one and black men is in class number two and must be governed by white men forever'. but now, in his irascible mood, he drafted a reply to be sent out over nicolay's signature requesting the writer to inform him 'whether you are either a white man or black one, because in either case, you cannot be regarded as an entirely impartial judge'. 'it may be, the president continued, in an unusual tone of sarcasm, that you belong to a third or fourth class of yellow or red men, in which case the impartiality of your judgment would be more apparant'.
l's sharp temper extended at times even to his closest advisers. montgomery blair, furious because early's (note: a general from the south) men had burned his house in silver spring, denounced the 'poltroons and cowards' responsible for the defenses of washington. halleck, always defensive of professional military men, demanded that the president either endorse 'such wholesale denouncement and accusation' or dismiss blair. l replied that he did not approve the postmaster general's remarks but that his words, which 'may have been hastily said in a moment of vexation at so severe a loss', were not sufficient grounds for removing him. 'i propose continuing to be myself the judge as to when a member of the cabinet shall be dismissed', he said sternly, and he took the unusual step of reading to the entire cabinet a carefully prepared memorandum; 'i must myself be the judge, how long to retain in, and when to remove any of you from, his position. it would greatly pain me to discover any of you endeavoring to procure anothers removal, or, in any way to prejudice him before the public. such endeavor would be a wrong to me; and much worse, a wrong to the country'.
on the more important issue of possible peace negotiations with the confederates, the president was obliged to control his anger. indeed, he gained a certain sardonic (characterized by bitter or scornful derision) from his skillful handling of the question. the prime mover was the erratic and excitable editor of the new york tribune. just as early's men were approaching the capital, greeley wrote l that his 'irrepressible friend' william c. jewett was certain that representatives of the confederate government were on the canadian side of niagara falls with full authority to negotiate a peace. greeley urged the president to explore the possibility, because the country was in such desperate shape. a full and generous announcement of union conditions for ending the war, even if they were not accepted,would remover the 'wide-spread conviction that the government and its prominent supporters are not anxious for peace' and help the republican cause in the fall elections.
correctly l suspected a trap. he could not know why the three confederate emissaries-former mississippi congressman jacob thompson, former alabama senator clement c. clay, and professor james p. holcombe of the university of virginia-were in canada, but his instincts told him that their purpose was not to make peace but to meddle in northern politics with a view to influencing the presidential election.
he could not reject the proposed negotiations outright, even though he thought greeley unreliable and mendacious. but this chosen intermediary of the confederates had the power to shape northern opinion. the new york tribune, widely distributed in the west as well as in the east, boasted the largest national circulation of any newspaper. the editor's letter, which reminded the president 'how intently the people desire any peace consistent with the national integrity and honor' and that an offer of fair terms would 'prove an immense and sorely needed advantage to the national cause', thinly masked a threat to go public in case l turned down this opportunity. if the tribune portrayed the president as flatly rejecting a reasonable peace negotiation, it could do irreparable damage.
shrewdly l solved his problem by naming greeley himself as his emissary to the confederates at niagara and authorizing him to bring to washington under safe conduct 'any person anywhere professing to have any proposition of jefferson davis in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the union and abandonment of slavery'. greeley objected. for all his countrified looks and his shuffling gait, the editor was no fool, and he was unwilling to become 'a confidant, far less an agent in such negotiations'. but the president refused to let him off the hook. 'i not only intend a sincere effort for peace, he wrote greeley, but i intend that you shall be a personal witness that it is made'. when greeley continued to delay, the president expressed disappointment: 'i was not expecting you to send me a letter, but to bring me a man, or men'. he then ordered john hay to accompany greeley to niagara falls, bearing a letter that spelled out the terms on which he was willing to deal with the confederate emissaries.
l himself drafted the letter, consulting only seward. addressed 'to whom it may concern', it read: 'any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole union, and the abandonment of slavery...will be received and considered by the executive government of the united states'. it also offered safe-conduct to the confederate negotiators and 'liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points.'
the letter reflected l's careful balancing of political considerations against military needs. he could best promote his chances in the fall election by requiring only minimal conditions for beginning negotiations with the confederates. if he announced that reunification of the nation was the sole condition for peace, he would cement the alliance that he had been trying for months to build with the war democrats, who loyally supported his efforts to restore the union, even though many of them had reservations about his emancipation policy. if, as he anticipated, jefferson davis rejected this reasonable, lenient offer, these democrats could more easily favor the reelection of a republican president.
but there was an unacceptable military risk in this approach. conceivably the confederates might accept reunion as a condition for discussing peace. if they did, they could propose a cease-fire during the progress of any negotiations, and l knew that the people were so war-weary and exhausted that it would be almost impossible to resume hostilities once arms were laid down. 'an armistice-a cessation of hostilities-is the end of the struggle, and the insurgents would be in peaceable possession of all that has been struggled for'.
consequently he had to appear open to peace negotiations while proposing terms that would make them impossible. the first of his conditions, the restoration of the union, was easy to predict; that was what the war, from the outset, had been about. but the second, requiring 'the abandonment of slavery' as a condition for peace talks, was a surprise. it went considerably beyond his own emancipation proclamation or any law of congress. the emancipation proclamation had freed slaves only in specified areas and had not ended the institution of slavery itself, and congress had just failed to adopt the 13th amendment outlawing slavery. this condition was one l knew the confederates would never accept.
l expected that the confederate emissaries would spurn his offer. when they rushed to print his 'to whom it may concern' letter, in order to show that he had torpedoed meaningful peace talks, he countered by publicizing the report he had just received from james r. gilmore and james f. jaquess, who had recently conducted their own unofficial peace mission to richmond. there jeff davis told them: the war...must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks,...unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. we are not fighting for slavery. we are fighting for independence,-and that, or extermination, we will have'. (note: with the failure of this objective the legal foundation of the american revolution (ie. a group of SOVEREIGN states deciding to unite, giving up..BUT NOT PERMANENTLY..their rights to act in ways varient to the other states IF NEED BE...)ended.) reasonable people could only conclude that neither president wanted serious peace negotiations.
the new york herald announced that publication of the president's 'to whom it may concern' letter 'sealed l's fate in the coming presidential campaign'. by making abolition as much a war aim as union, the president gave new strength to the democratic party, preparing for its national convention in chicago at the end of august. opposition leaders declared that letter proved l did not really want to end the war 'even if an honorable peace were within his grasp'. 'all he has a right to require of the south is submission to the constitution', democratic editors announced. they were sure that 'the people of the loyal states will teach him, they will not supply men and treasure to prosecute a war in the interest of the black race'.
the president's letter also undermined his support in his own party. at first, oddly enough, the erosion was most noticeable among the radicals. greeley's animus toward the president increased after his venture into amateur diplomacy became a subject of ridicule. he was not alone. radicals, who should have been pleased by the president's firm insistence on abolition, felt they had lincoln on the run, and they began to express all their pent-up grievances and frustrations at the president's slowness, his timidity, his indecisiveness, his fence-straddling, his incompetence, his leniency toward the rebels. chase, though ostensibly out of politics, spent much of the summer in new england conferring with other anti-l republicans and spreading the news that there was 'great and almost universal dissatisfaction with mr. l among all earnest men'. in boston he frequently conferred with sumner, who grumbled that the country needed 'a president with brains; one who can make a plan and carry it out'. pomeroy, the original head of the chase movement, and wade, coauthor of the reconstruction bill l had just vetoed, joined them for a conference, which, as a newspaper correspondent shrewdly surmised, 'boded no good to Father Abraham'. radical disaffection was not confined to new england. in iowa, grimes concluded: 'this entire administration has been a disgrace from the very beginning to every one who had any thing to do with bringing it into power. i take my full share of the ...shame to myself. i can atone for what i have done no otherwise than in refusing to be instrumental in continuing it'.
on august 5 this dissatisfaction with l exploded with the publication of a protest by wade and henry winter davis against l's 'grave executive usurpation' in pocket-vetoing their reconstruction bill. the congressmen found the president's public message explaining the reasons for his action even more offensive than the veto. 'a more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated',', they fumed; it was a 'blow at the friends of his administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles of republican government'. l must know that 'the authority of congress is paramount and must be respected...; and if he wishes our support, he must confine himself to his executive duties-to obey and execute, not make the laws'.
publication of the wade-davis 'manifesto', as it was generally called, produced a short-lived political commotion. democrats, of course, enjoyed the spectacle of prominent congressional leaders attacking the presidential nominee of their own party, and they congratulated 'the country that two republicans have been found willing at last to resent the encroachments of the executive on the authority of congress'. the manifesto, according to the new york world, was 'a blow between the eyes which will daze the president'. the new york herald, always glad to jab at the administration, called it an acknowledgment that l was 'an egregious failure' who ought 'to retire from the position to which, in an evil hour, he was exalted'. but the rhetoric of the proclamation was so excessive and the accusations against l so extreme that the charges backfired. most republican papers criticized wade and davis more severely than they did the president.
l did not read the manifesto. he had no desire to get involved in a controversy with its authors, he told welles. the attack saddened him and he admitted to noah brooks, 'to be wounded in the house of one's friends' is perhaps the most grievous affliction that can befall a man'. but he refused to brood about it. 'it is not worth fretting about, he joked; it reminds me of an old acquaintance, who, having a son of a scientific turn, bought him a microscope. the boy went around, experimenting with his glass upon everything...one day, at the dinner-table, his father took up a piece of cheese. 'con't eat that, father, said the boy; it is full of wrigglers'. 'my son, replied the old gentleman, taking...a huge bite, let 'em wriggle; i can stand it if they can'.'
less public, but more dangerous to the president, was a radical plan to replace l, already the official nominee of his party, with another candidate who would be more positive and energetic, who would be more deeply committed to equal rights, and who would, presumably, have a greater chance of success. little groups of radicals in boston, cincinnati, and, especially, new york concocted plans for summoning a new republican nominating convention. some of the schemers favored chase; others, butler. few looked to fremont, whose candidacy was already failing and they tried to get him to withdraw from the race on the condition that l did so. most put their hopes on grant.
in a preliminary meeting on august 18, about 25 radicals gathered at the house of mayor george opdyke of new york. the editors of the major newspapers-greeley of the tribune, parke godwin of the evening post, theodore tilton of the independent, and george wildes of the spirit of the times-were present, as were wade, davis, and governor john a. andrew of massachusetts. chase sent his regrets, hoping that the deliberations would be 'fruitful, of the benefit to our country, never more in need of wise words and fearless action by and among patriotic men'. sumner too stayed away. 'i do not as yet see the presidential horizon', he explained. i wait for the blue lights of (the democratic convention at) chicago, which will present the true outlines'. those who did attend-the diarist george templeton strong termed them 'our wire-pullers and secret, unofficial governors'- decided to send out a circular letter calling for a new convention, to be held at cincinnati on sept. 28, which would 'concentrate the union strength on some one candidate who commands the confidence of the country, even by a new nomination if necessary'. less politely davis said that the convention was intended 'to get rid of mr lincoln and name new candidates'. to make final arrangements they promised to meet again on aug. 30.
inevitably reports of these plans reached l's ears. he was neither surprised nor worried by most of the schemes to replace him as the nominee of the republican party, but he was alarmed when he heard that the dissidents were thinking of running grant. he did not think the general had political aspirations but, concluding that he ought to sound him out again, he asked colonel john eaton, who had worked closely with grant in caring for the freedmen in the mississippi valley, to go to the army of the potomac and ascertain his views. at city point, eaton told grant that many people thought he ought to run for president, not as a party man but as a citizens' candidate, in order to save the union. bringing his hand down on the arm of his chair, grant replied: 'they can't do it! they can't compel me to do it!' he went on to say that he considered it 'as important for the cause that (l) should be elected as that the army should be successful in the field'. when eaton reported the conversation to the president, his relief was obvious. 'i told you, he said, they could not get him to run until he had closed out the rebellion'.
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