(approaching the election of 1864) 'i cannot run the political machine, lincoln was quoted as saying during the campaign; i have enough on my hands without THAT. it is the PEOPLE'S business'. he did not take part in any of the hundreds of campaign marches and torchlight processions staged by the national union (republican) party throughout the north. he was not involved in the work of the loyal publication societies, headed by francis lieber in new york and by john murray forbes in boston, which distributed more than half a million union pamphlets bearing titles like 'no party now but all for our country'. he did nothing to encourage partisan newspapers that attacked the democrats as copperheads or charged that they were engaged in a 'peace party plot!' (indeed, he discounted tales of copperhead conspiracies as puerile (childishly foolish)
nor did l take public notice of the attacks democrats made on him during the campaign. he did not comment on democratic rallies where partisans carried banners reading TIME TO SWAP HORSES, NOVEMBER 8TH or NO MORE VULGAR JOKES. he probably never saw scurrilous democratic pamphlets, like the Lincoln catechism, wherein the eccentricities & beauties of despotism are fully set forth, which called him 'abraham africanus the first' and quoted the first of the president's own ten commandments:
'thou shalt have no other God but the negro'. the repeated democratic charge that he and the republicans favored intermarriage of blacks and whites l acknowledged only indirectly, joking that miscegenation was 'a democratic mode of producing good union men, and i dont propose to infringe on the patent'. he did not respond to democratic charges, raised in as respectable a journal as the new york world, that his administration was characterized by 'ignorance, incompetency, and corruption'. though he was, as mrs. l said, 'almost monomaniac on the subject of honesty', he did not refute the charge that he had helped a relative defraud the quartermaster's department in st. louis.
only once was he tempted to reply to a personal attack. democratic newspapers now revived the canard (a false or baseless, usually derogatory report, rumor etc.) that while touring the antietam battlefield in september 1862 he had asked ward lamon to sing 'a comic negro song'; they claimed that such behavior demonstrated that he was not 'fit for any office of trust, or even for decent society'. belligerently lamon attempted to refute the slander, but l, thinking it would be better simply to state the facts, wrote out his own account of how he had indeed-days after the battle and far from the soldiers' cemetery-asked lamon to sing 'a little sad song'. then he told lamon not to publish his reply, saying, 'i dislike to appear as an apologist for an act of my own which i know was right'.
l's public appearances during the campaign were rare. in june he did attend the great central sanitary fair, held in philadelphia to raise money for the sanitary commission and other groups providing for the needs of the soldiers, but he said little. 'i do not really think it is proper in my position for me to make a political speech, he told a group at the hotel continental, and...being more a politician than anything else, i am without anything to say'. when volunteer regiments, on their way home as their terms of enlistment expired, came by the white house, he thanked them for their service and said nothing more partisan than that they should 'rise up to the height of a generation of men worthy of a free government'.
Sunday, July 8, 2012
Saturday, July 7, 2012
7.7.2012 AM I OIKTIRMONES?
in luke 6.35f Jesus commands His disciples,
LOVE ye your enemies and DO GOOD and LEND, hoping for nothing again; and
your reward shall be great and
ye shall be the children of the Highest;
for He is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil.
BE ye therefore MERCIFUL,
as your Father also is merciful.
i can get my mind around the concepts of doing good and lending. these are things that in the conceit (excessively favorable opinion of one's own ability) of my heart i think i can actually do on my own without God's help but when it comes to merciful...it is far beyond even my conceit and i am made to know i need God...that there is absolutely no way i can even attempt to be merciful from the heart. i'm so sick of putting on masks...trying to send 'signals' to people so they will say to themselves, 'my, how merciful the boy is!'. i'm sick of garbage religion in place of the inner reality of Jesus coming directly to the hearts of others. my flesh screams for recognition, but the spirit is so thirsty for the reality of known within and genuinely flowing out.
the normal word for 'mercy' in the new testament is the greek, eleos, translated 'mercy, pity,compassion'. but here Jesus commands me as His disciple to be oiktirmones as God the Father is oiktirmones.
eleos is related to such hebrew words in the old testament as:
-kopher-the price of a life, ransom (word used in 'the mercy seat' which was in the holy of holies)
-racham-compassion (a feeling of deep sympathy and sorrow for another who is stricken by misfortune, accompanied by a strong desire to alleviate the suffering)
-chasad-to be good, kind (II samuel 15.20) (note: hope these scriptures are correct..did not check)
-chanan-show favor, be gracious (job 9.15; daniel 4.27)
-chamal-to spare (job 16.13; isaiah 63.9)
looking at these hebrew words, all but kopher pretty well match the new testament understanding of eleos..except kopher. kopher gives 'the heart' of, the source of 'mercy'. someone totally innocent has to die for someone totally guilty. their blood has to be shed and that shed blood covers the sin of the guilty one.
but oiktirmones, i don't think...has any related hebrew words to help understand it. it seems though that eleos is more related to
LOVE ye your enemies and DO GOOD and LEND, hoping for nothing again; and
your reward shall be great and
ye shall be the children of the Highest;
for He is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil.
BE ye therefore MERCIFUL,
as your Father also is merciful.
i can get my mind around the concepts of doing good and lending. these are things that in the conceit (excessively favorable opinion of one's own ability) of my heart i think i can actually do on my own without God's help but when it comes to merciful...it is far beyond even my conceit and i am made to know i need God...that there is absolutely no way i can even attempt to be merciful from the heart. i'm so sick of putting on masks...trying to send 'signals' to people so they will say to themselves, 'my, how merciful the boy is!'. i'm sick of garbage religion in place of the inner reality of Jesus coming directly to the hearts of others. my flesh screams for recognition, but the spirit is so thirsty for the reality of known within and genuinely flowing out.
the normal word for 'mercy' in the new testament is the greek, eleos, translated 'mercy, pity,compassion'. but here Jesus commands me as His disciple to be oiktirmones as God the Father is oiktirmones.
eleos is related to such hebrew words in the old testament as:
-kopher-the price of a life, ransom (word used in 'the mercy seat' which was in the holy of holies)
-racham-compassion (a feeling of deep sympathy and sorrow for another who is stricken by misfortune, accompanied by a strong desire to alleviate the suffering)
-chasad-to be good, kind (II samuel 15.20) (note: hope these scriptures are correct..did not check)
-chanan-show favor, be gracious (job 9.15; daniel 4.27)
-chamal-to spare (job 16.13; isaiah 63.9)
looking at these hebrew words, all but kopher pretty well match the new testament understanding of eleos..except kopher. kopher gives 'the heart' of, the source of 'mercy'. someone totally innocent has to die for someone totally guilty. their blood has to be shed and that shed blood covers the sin of the guilty one.
but oiktirmones, i don't think...has any related hebrew words to help understand it. it seems though that eleos is more related to
Friday, July 6, 2012
7.6.2012 LINCOLN: PRINCIPLE OR POLITICS II
lincoln was more troubled by the effect that his 'to whom it may concern' letter had on the conservative elements of his following. it hit the war democrats hardest. charles d. robinson, democratic editor of the green bay (wisconsin) advocate, best expressed their views. up to now, despite sharp criticism from other democrats, he had sustained the president's war policy as the only method of putting down the rebellion. he had even accepted the emancipation proclamation, because he believed that depriving the confederacy of its laborers weakened the rebels. but now, he lamented in a letter to l, the requirement of the abandonment of slavery as a condition for peace talks 'puts the whole war question on a new basis, and takes us war democrats clear off our feet, leaving us no ground to stand upon'.
recognizing that robinson spoke for large numbers of war democrats. whose support for the national union ticket was central to his reelection strategy, l felt compelled to draft a reply. HAD HE FAILED TO INSIST ON ABOLITION AS A CONDITION FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, he explained, HE WOULD BE GUILTY OF TREACHERY TO THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS WHO HAD 'COME BODILY OVER FROM THE REBEL SIDE TO OURS.' such a betrayal could not escape the curses of heaven, or of any good man'. apart from the moral issue, there was the practical consideration that without 'the physical force which the colored people now give, and promise us,...neither the present nor any coming administration, can save the union'.
but recognizing the genuineness of robinson's concerns, the president also sought to soften his policy. 'saying re-union and abandonment of slavery would be considered, if offered, is not saying that nothing else or less would be considered, if offered, is not saying that nothing else or less would be considered, if offered,' he suggested. 'if jeff davis wishes ..to know what i would do if he were to offer peace and re-union, saying nothing about slavery, let him try me.'
the president's apparent willingness to modify his peace terms in order to hold the allegiance of the war democrats was echoed the next day in the new york times: 'mr. l did say that he would receive and consider propositions for peace,...if they embraced the integrity of the union and the abandonment of slavery. but he did not say that he would not receive them unless they embraced both these conditions'.
l decided to hold his letter to robinson until he could discuss its contents with former governor alexander w. randall and judge joseph t. mills, both, like robinson, from wisconsin. as he talked to them, his impatience with the war democrats became increasingly evident. if they really wanted to end the war without interfering with slavery, 'the field was open to them to have enlisted and put down this rebellion by force of arms...long before the present policy was inaugurated'. but now, if he followed their advice, he would have to do without the help of nearly 200,000 black men in the service of the union. in that case 'we would be compelled to abandon the war in 3 weeks'. practical considerations aside, there was the moral issue. how could anybody propose 'to return to slavery the black warriors of port hudson and olustee to their masters to conciliate the south'? 'i should be damned in time and in eternity for so doing', he told his visitors. 'THE WORLD SHALL KNOW THAT I WILL KEEP MY FAITH TO FRIENDS AND ENEMIES, COME WHAT WILL.'
that same afternoon l tried his letter out on frederick douglass, the great african-american spokesman whom he considered 'one of the most meritorious men in america'. when douglass heard that the president would be willing to consider a peace plan that did not include abolition, his eyes flashed in anger and he strongly objected to the letter. 'it would be given a broader meaning than you intend to convey, he warned. it would be taken as a complete surrender of your antislavery policy, and do you serious damage'.
touched by douglass's earnestness and, no doubt, affected by his own eloquence in the interview with randall and mills, l put aside the letter to robinson and never sent it. in effect, HE GAVE UP ON WILLING THE SUPPORT OF THE WAR DEMOCRATS, most of whom quietly returned to their allegiance to the democratic party in the fall elections.
even more serious was the erosion of the president's support among conservative republicans. these moderates did not form a cohesive group, either in the congress or in the country, and their opinions on issues like emancipation and reconstruction covered a broad range. most recognized that the end of slavery was inevitable but were distressed that l had now chosen to make abolition a necessary condition for peace negotiations. claiming to speak for 'the great body of the respectable part of the country', the new york merchant prince william e. dodge wanted a peace that 'would be honorable to the north and so liberal to the south as to give the lie to the assertion that the north hated them and wished to destroy them'.
l's peace terms suggested that he was 'so fully committed to the entire abolition of slavery as a condition of peace that he will use all the power of the government to continue the war till either the south is destroyed or they consent to give up the slaves'. many of the moderates were sure that the president's policy would strengthen the confederate will to resist; more were troubled because the president's policy opened them to attack as abolitionists, miscegenationists, and amalgamationists.
had the war been moving toward a rapid conclusion, most of these fears could have been allayed, but in the late summer of 1864 disaster continued to follow disaster. on july 30, after weeks of inactivity, grant tried to break the defenses of petersburg by exploding a huge mine under the confederate line; 15,000 union troops rushed int the crater produced by the explosion, but they were poorly led by drunken or incompetent officers and within hours 4,000 men were killed or wounded and the rest had to be withdrawn. even before this fiasco, as losses in both the army of the potomac and in sherman's army continued to mount, l had felt obliged to call for 500,000 more soldiers; if by september there were not enough volunteers, he would resort to a draft. this time the draft was going to hit comfortable, middle-class families, because congress had recently abolished the provision that had allowed a man to 'commute' his military service by paying $300. almost simultaneously, as the costs of the war grew steadily, secretary of the treasury fessenden had to announce a new $200,000,000 loan, and the credit of the government was now so poor that he had difficulty finking purchasers.
faced with all these problems, moderate republicans rarely broke with the president, but they gave his reelection campaign only tepid support. in the cabinet itself attorney general bates saw no alternative to l but felt that the country lacked direction and 'that our great want was a competent man at the head of affairs,...a competent leader'. orville browning (note: one of the very few personal friends the president had) felt even more alienated, and he wrote a fellow moderate: 'you know, strange as it may seem to you, that i am personally attached to the president, and have faithfully tried to uphold him, and make him respectabele; tho' i never have been able to persuade myself that he was big enough for his position. still, i thought he might get through, as many a boy through college, without degrace, and without knowledge; and i fear he is a failure'.
in new york disaffection among moderates posed a special problem for l because their leader, thurlow weed, was more critical of the president than ever. the new york boss was convinced that l went too far in making abolition a condition for peace negotiations. 'as things now stand mr. l's re-election is and impossibility, he concluded. the People are wild for peace, he explained to seward. they are told that the president will only listen to terms of peace on condition (that) slavery be abandoned'.
'i am fearful our hold upon mr weed is slight, wrote abram wakeman, the new york postmaster, who was one of l's staunchest supporters. he evidently has his eye upon some other probable candidate'. weed was indeed flirting with the democrates. though he said he would zealously support l if the democrats nominated a peace man, he publicly offered his voice and vote to any presidential nominee who took as his platform the crittenden resolution of 1861, which declared that the sole object of the war was the preservation of the union.
as usual, weed's disenchantment with the administration stemmed not merely from l's policies but from his distribution of the patronage and public funds in new york. chase's protege, hiram barney, remained collector in the all-important customs house, though a moderate complained 'that he is a perfect negative man, and possesses no knowledge of politics in any shape and makes no pretensions (sic) to such knowledge'. rufus f. andrews, the surveyor, was 'a political adventurer from the start', who failed to support the regular nominees of the republican party. (note: it seems that part of lincoln's wisdom....'in a multitude of counselors there is wisdom'... was keeping people of other political viewpoints in many positions so the government would 'look something like' the country that elected it...a policy not often followed) other moderates alerted the president that there must be 'an immediate change in the offices of the collector and surveyor of the port of new york'.
'the tide is setting strongly against us', henry j. raymond, chairman of the national union executive committee, warned the president on aug. 22. raymond had heard from wahburne that illinois would go democratic, from cameron that pennsylvania would be against l, and from governor morton that 'nothing but the most strenuous efforts can carry indiana'. he himself predicted that new york would give the democratic candidate a majority of 50,000 votes. some voters were complaining of the want of military successes; others voiced 'fear and suspicion...that we are not, to have peace in any event under this administration until slavery is abandoned'. 'nothing but the most resolute and decided action on the part of the government and its friends, he told l, can save the country from falling into hostile hands'.
this message confirmed l's own pessimistic appraisal of the situation. ' you think i don't know i am going to be beaten, he said to a friend, but i do and unless some great change takes place badly beaten'. on aug 23, with raymond's letter before him, he drafted and signed a memorandum: 'this morning, as for some days past, IT SEEMS EXCEEDINGLY PROBABLE THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT BE RE-ELECTED. then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the president elect, as to save the union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that this administration will not be re-elected. THEN IT WILL BE NY DUTY TO SO CO-OPERATE WITH THE PRESIDENT ELECT, AS TO SAVE THE UNION BETWEEN THE ELECTION AND THE INAUGURATION; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards'.
l's language revealed not merely his pessimism about his own fortunes but his realistic understanding of the forces that opposed his reelection. he did not say that if he was defeated the country would fall into the hands of copperheads who would consent to the division of the union and the recognition of the confederacy. he did not think the democrats were disloyal. there had been 'much impugning of motives, and much heated controversy as to the proper means and best mode of advancing the union cause', he conceded, but he derived great satisfaction in recording that 'a great majority of the opposing party' was as firmly committed as the republicans to maintaining the integrity of the union, and he noted with pride that 'no candidate for office whatever, high or low, has ventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up the union'. nor did he have doubts about the loyalty of george b. meClellan, whose nomination by the democrats he anticipated. but he did think that if the democrats elected mcClellan the party platform would force the new administration to seek an armistice, which virtually assured confederate independence.
folding and sealing his memorandum carefully, so that none of the text was visible, l put it aside until the next cabinet meeting, when he asked each member to sign his name on the back of the document. as he explained later, his purpose was to talk with mcClellan, whose election he thought probable, saying: GENERAL, THE ELECTION HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT YOU ARE STRONGER, HAVE MORE INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAN I. NOW LET US TOGETHER, YOU WITH YOUR INFLUENCE AND I WITH ALL THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT, TRY TO SAVE THE COUNTRY.' he had little hope that mcClellan would do anything, but, he added, AT LEAST ...I SHOULD HAVE DONE MY DUTY AND HAVE STOOD CLEAR BEFORE MY OWN CONSCIENCE'.
recognizing that robinson spoke for large numbers of war democrats. whose support for the national union ticket was central to his reelection strategy, l felt compelled to draft a reply. HAD HE FAILED TO INSIST ON ABOLITION AS A CONDITION FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, he explained, HE WOULD BE GUILTY OF TREACHERY TO THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS WHO HAD 'COME BODILY OVER FROM THE REBEL SIDE TO OURS.' such a betrayal could not escape the curses of heaven, or of any good man'. apart from the moral issue, there was the practical consideration that without 'the physical force which the colored people now give, and promise us,...neither the present nor any coming administration, can save the union'.
but recognizing the genuineness of robinson's concerns, the president also sought to soften his policy. 'saying re-union and abandonment of slavery would be considered, if offered, is not saying that nothing else or less would be considered, if offered, is not saying that nothing else or less would be considered, if offered,' he suggested. 'if jeff davis wishes ..to know what i would do if he were to offer peace and re-union, saying nothing about slavery, let him try me.'
the president's apparent willingness to modify his peace terms in order to hold the allegiance of the war democrats was echoed the next day in the new york times: 'mr. l did say that he would receive and consider propositions for peace,...if they embraced the integrity of the union and the abandonment of slavery. but he did not say that he would not receive them unless they embraced both these conditions'.
l decided to hold his letter to robinson until he could discuss its contents with former governor alexander w. randall and judge joseph t. mills, both, like robinson, from wisconsin. as he talked to them, his impatience with the war democrats became increasingly evident. if they really wanted to end the war without interfering with slavery, 'the field was open to them to have enlisted and put down this rebellion by force of arms...long before the present policy was inaugurated'. but now, if he followed their advice, he would have to do without the help of nearly 200,000 black men in the service of the union. in that case 'we would be compelled to abandon the war in 3 weeks'. practical considerations aside, there was the moral issue. how could anybody propose 'to return to slavery the black warriors of port hudson and olustee to their masters to conciliate the south'? 'i should be damned in time and in eternity for so doing', he told his visitors. 'THE WORLD SHALL KNOW THAT I WILL KEEP MY FAITH TO FRIENDS AND ENEMIES, COME WHAT WILL.'
that same afternoon l tried his letter out on frederick douglass, the great african-american spokesman whom he considered 'one of the most meritorious men in america'. when douglass heard that the president would be willing to consider a peace plan that did not include abolition, his eyes flashed in anger and he strongly objected to the letter. 'it would be given a broader meaning than you intend to convey, he warned. it would be taken as a complete surrender of your antislavery policy, and do you serious damage'.
touched by douglass's earnestness and, no doubt, affected by his own eloquence in the interview with randall and mills, l put aside the letter to robinson and never sent it. in effect, HE GAVE UP ON WILLING THE SUPPORT OF THE WAR DEMOCRATS, most of whom quietly returned to their allegiance to the democratic party in the fall elections.
even more serious was the erosion of the president's support among conservative republicans. these moderates did not form a cohesive group, either in the congress or in the country, and their opinions on issues like emancipation and reconstruction covered a broad range. most recognized that the end of slavery was inevitable but were distressed that l had now chosen to make abolition a necessary condition for peace negotiations. claiming to speak for 'the great body of the respectable part of the country', the new york merchant prince william e. dodge wanted a peace that 'would be honorable to the north and so liberal to the south as to give the lie to the assertion that the north hated them and wished to destroy them'.
l's peace terms suggested that he was 'so fully committed to the entire abolition of slavery as a condition of peace that he will use all the power of the government to continue the war till either the south is destroyed or they consent to give up the slaves'. many of the moderates were sure that the president's policy would strengthen the confederate will to resist; more were troubled because the president's policy opened them to attack as abolitionists, miscegenationists, and amalgamationists.
had the war been moving toward a rapid conclusion, most of these fears could have been allayed, but in the late summer of 1864 disaster continued to follow disaster. on july 30, after weeks of inactivity, grant tried to break the defenses of petersburg by exploding a huge mine under the confederate line; 15,000 union troops rushed int the crater produced by the explosion, but they were poorly led by drunken or incompetent officers and within hours 4,000 men were killed or wounded and the rest had to be withdrawn. even before this fiasco, as losses in both the army of the potomac and in sherman's army continued to mount, l had felt obliged to call for 500,000 more soldiers; if by september there were not enough volunteers, he would resort to a draft. this time the draft was going to hit comfortable, middle-class families, because congress had recently abolished the provision that had allowed a man to 'commute' his military service by paying $300. almost simultaneously, as the costs of the war grew steadily, secretary of the treasury fessenden had to announce a new $200,000,000 loan, and the credit of the government was now so poor that he had difficulty finking purchasers.
faced with all these problems, moderate republicans rarely broke with the president, but they gave his reelection campaign only tepid support. in the cabinet itself attorney general bates saw no alternative to l but felt that the country lacked direction and 'that our great want was a competent man at the head of affairs,...a competent leader'. orville browning (note: one of the very few personal friends the president had) felt even more alienated, and he wrote a fellow moderate: 'you know, strange as it may seem to you, that i am personally attached to the president, and have faithfully tried to uphold him, and make him respectabele; tho' i never have been able to persuade myself that he was big enough for his position. still, i thought he might get through, as many a boy through college, without degrace, and without knowledge; and i fear he is a failure'.
in new york disaffection among moderates posed a special problem for l because their leader, thurlow weed, was more critical of the president than ever. the new york boss was convinced that l went too far in making abolition a condition for peace negotiations. 'as things now stand mr. l's re-election is and impossibility, he concluded. the People are wild for peace, he explained to seward. they are told that the president will only listen to terms of peace on condition (that) slavery be abandoned'.
'i am fearful our hold upon mr weed is slight, wrote abram wakeman, the new york postmaster, who was one of l's staunchest supporters. he evidently has his eye upon some other probable candidate'. weed was indeed flirting with the democrates. though he said he would zealously support l if the democrats nominated a peace man, he publicly offered his voice and vote to any presidential nominee who took as his platform the crittenden resolution of 1861, which declared that the sole object of the war was the preservation of the union.
as usual, weed's disenchantment with the administration stemmed not merely from l's policies but from his distribution of the patronage and public funds in new york. chase's protege, hiram barney, remained collector in the all-important customs house, though a moderate complained 'that he is a perfect negative man, and possesses no knowledge of politics in any shape and makes no pretensions (sic) to such knowledge'. rufus f. andrews, the surveyor, was 'a political adventurer from the start', who failed to support the regular nominees of the republican party. (note: it seems that part of lincoln's wisdom....'in a multitude of counselors there is wisdom'... was keeping people of other political viewpoints in many positions so the government would 'look something like' the country that elected it...a policy not often followed) other moderates alerted the president that there must be 'an immediate change in the offices of the collector and surveyor of the port of new york'.
'the tide is setting strongly against us', henry j. raymond, chairman of the national union executive committee, warned the president on aug. 22. raymond had heard from wahburne that illinois would go democratic, from cameron that pennsylvania would be against l, and from governor morton that 'nothing but the most strenuous efforts can carry indiana'. he himself predicted that new york would give the democratic candidate a majority of 50,000 votes. some voters were complaining of the want of military successes; others voiced 'fear and suspicion...that we are not, to have peace in any event under this administration until slavery is abandoned'. 'nothing but the most resolute and decided action on the part of the government and its friends, he told l, can save the country from falling into hostile hands'.
this message confirmed l's own pessimistic appraisal of the situation. ' you think i don't know i am going to be beaten, he said to a friend, but i do and unless some great change takes place badly beaten'. on aug 23, with raymond's letter before him, he drafted and signed a memorandum: 'this morning, as for some days past, IT SEEMS EXCEEDINGLY PROBABLE THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT BE RE-ELECTED. then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the president elect, as to save the union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that this administration will not be re-elected. THEN IT WILL BE NY DUTY TO SO CO-OPERATE WITH THE PRESIDENT ELECT, AS TO SAVE THE UNION BETWEEN THE ELECTION AND THE INAUGURATION; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards'.
l's language revealed not merely his pessimism about his own fortunes but his realistic understanding of the forces that opposed his reelection. he did not say that if he was defeated the country would fall into the hands of copperheads who would consent to the division of the union and the recognition of the confederacy. he did not think the democrats were disloyal. there had been 'much impugning of motives, and much heated controversy as to the proper means and best mode of advancing the union cause', he conceded, but he derived great satisfaction in recording that 'a great majority of the opposing party' was as firmly committed as the republicans to maintaining the integrity of the union, and he noted with pride that 'no candidate for office whatever, high or low, has ventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up the union'. nor did he have doubts about the loyalty of george b. meClellan, whose nomination by the democrats he anticipated. but he did think that if the democrats elected mcClellan the party platform would force the new administration to seek an armistice, which virtually assured confederate independence.
folding and sealing his memorandum carefully, so that none of the text was visible, l put it aside until the next cabinet meeting, when he asked each member to sign his name on the back of the document. as he explained later, his purpose was to talk with mcClellan, whose election he thought probable, saying: GENERAL, THE ELECTION HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT YOU ARE STRONGER, HAVE MORE INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAN I. NOW LET US TOGETHER, YOU WITH YOUR INFLUENCE AND I WITH ALL THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT, TRY TO SAVE THE COUNTRY.' he had little hope that mcClellan would do anything, but, he added, AT LEAST ...I SHOULD HAVE DONE MY DUTY AND HAVE STOOD CLEAR BEFORE MY OWN CONSCIENCE'.
Thursday, July 5, 2012
7.5.2012 LINCOLN: PRINCIPLE OR POLITICS? I
it was not only grant who tried l's patience during these unusually hot, depressing summer months of 1864. usually he was ready to spend countless hours listening to visitors who brought him their complaints and petitions, sometimes over quite trivial matters, but now he had had enough. when two citizens of maine asked him to intervene to settle a personal problem, the president sharply responded: you want me to end your suspense? i'll do so. dont let me hear another word about your case'. a few days later his anger erupted again when charles gibson resigned as solicitor in the court of claims, protesting the radicalism of the republican platform but expressing gratitude to the president for treating him with 'personal kindness and consideration'. with what bates called 'blind impetuosity' l lashed back that there were '2 small draw-backs upon mr. gibson's right to still receive such treatment, one of which is that he never could learn of his giving much attention to the duties of his office, and the other is this studied attempt of mr. gibson's to stab him'.
in calmer times l would have ignored a semi literate communication form a pennsylvania man who urged him to remember that 'white men is in class number one and black men is in class number two and must be governed by white men forever'. but now, in his irascible mood, he drafted a reply to be sent out over nicolay's signature requesting the writer to inform him 'whether you are either a white man or black one, because in either case, you cannot be regarded as an entirely impartial judge'. 'it may be, the president continued, in an unusual tone of sarcasm, that you belong to a third or fourth class of yellow or red men, in which case the impartiality of your judgment would be more apparant'.
l's sharp temper extended at times even to his closest advisers. montgomery blair, furious because early's (note: a general from the south) men had burned his house in silver spring, denounced the 'poltroons and cowards' responsible for the defenses of washington. halleck, always defensive of professional military men, demanded that the president either endorse 'such wholesale denouncement and accusation' or dismiss blair. l replied that he did not approve the postmaster general's remarks but that his words, which 'may have been hastily said in a moment of vexation at so severe a loss', were not sufficient grounds for removing him. 'i propose continuing to be myself the judge as to when a member of the cabinet shall be dismissed', he said sternly, and he took the unusual step of reading to the entire cabinet a carefully prepared memorandum; 'i must myself be the judge, how long to retain in, and when to remove any of you from, his position. it would greatly pain me to discover any of you endeavoring to procure anothers removal, or, in any way to prejudice him before the public. such endeavor would be a wrong to me; and much worse, a wrong to the country'.
on the more important issue of possible peace negotiations with the confederates, the president was obliged to control his anger. indeed, he gained a certain sardonic (characterized by bitter or scornful derision) from his skillful handling of the question. the prime mover was the erratic and excitable editor of the new york tribune. just as early's men were approaching the capital, greeley wrote l that his 'irrepressible friend' william c. jewett was certain that representatives of the confederate government were on the canadian side of niagara falls with full authority to negotiate a peace. greeley urged the president to explore the possibility, because the country was in such desperate shape. a full and generous announcement of union conditions for ending the war, even if they were not accepted,would remover the 'wide-spread conviction that the government and its prominent supporters are not anxious for peace' and help the republican cause in the fall elections.
correctly l suspected a trap. he could not know why the three confederate emissaries-former mississippi congressman jacob thompson, former alabama senator clement c. clay, and professor james p. holcombe of the university of virginia-were in canada, but his instincts told him that their purpose was not to make peace but to meddle in northern politics with a view to influencing the presidential election.
he could not reject the proposed negotiations outright, even though he thought greeley unreliable and mendacious. but this chosen intermediary of the confederates had the power to shape northern opinion. the new york tribune, widely distributed in the west as well as in the east, boasted the largest national circulation of any newspaper. the editor's letter, which reminded the president 'how intently the people desire any peace consistent with the national integrity and honor' and that an offer of fair terms would 'prove an immense and sorely needed advantage to the national cause', thinly masked a threat to go public in case l turned down this opportunity. if the tribune portrayed the president as flatly rejecting a reasonable peace negotiation, it could do irreparable damage.
shrewdly l solved his problem by naming greeley himself as his emissary to the confederates at niagara and authorizing him to bring to washington under safe conduct 'any person anywhere professing to have any proposition of jefferson davis in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the union and abandonment of slavery'. greeley objected. for all his countrified looks and his shuffling gait, the editor was no fool, and he was unwilling to become 'a confidant, far less an agent in such negotiations'. but the president refused to let him off the hook. 'i not only intend a sincere effort for peace, he wrote greeley, but i intend that you shall be a personal witness that it is made'. when greeley continued to delay, the president expressed disappointment: 'i was not expecting you to send me a letter, but to bring me a man, or men'. he then ordered john hay to accompany greeley to niagara falls, bearing a letter that spelled out the terms on which he was willing to deal with the confederate emissaries.
l himself drafted the letter, consulting only seward. addressed 'to whom it may concern', it read: 'any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole union, and the abandonment of slavery...will be received and considered by the executive government of the united states'. it also offered safe-conduct to the confederate negotiators and 'liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points.'
the letter reflected l's careful balancing of political considerations against military needs. he could best promote his chances in the fall election by requiring only minimal conditions for beginning negotiations with the confederates. if he announced that reunification of the nation was the sole condition for peace, he would cement the alliance that he had been trying for months to build with the war democrats, who loyally supported his efforts to restore the union, even though many of them had reservations about his emancipation policy. if, as he anticipated, jefferson davis rejected this reasonable, lenient offer, these democrats could more easily favor the reelection of a republican president.
but there was an unacceptable military risk in this approach. conceivably the confederates might accept reunion as a condition for discussing peace. if they did, they could propose a cease-fire during the progress of any negotiations, and l knew that the people were so war-weary and exhausted that it would be almost impossible to resume hostilities once arms were laid down. 'an armistice-a cessation of hostilities-is the end of the struggle, and the insurgents would be in peaceable possession of all that has been struggled for'.
consequently he had to appear open to peace negotiations while proposing terms that would make them impossible. the first of his conditions, the restoration of the union, was easy to predict; that was what the war, from the outset, had been about. but the second, requiring 'the abandonment of slavery' as a condition for peace talks, was a surprise. it went considerably beyond his own emancipation proclamation or any law of congress. the emancipation proclamation had freed slaves only in specified areas and had not ended the institution of slavery itself, and congress had just failed to adopt the 13th amendment outlawing slavery. this condition was one l knew the confederates would never accept.
l expected that the confederate emissaries would spurn his offer. when they rushed to print his 'to whom it may concern' letter, in order to show that he had torpedoed meaningful peace talks, he countered by publicizing the report he had just received from james r. gilmore and james f. jaquess, who had recently conducted their own unofficial peace mission to richmond. there jeff davis told them: the war...must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks,...unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. we are not fighting for slavery. we are fighting for independence,-and that, or extermination, we will have'. (note: with the failure of this objective the legal foundation of the american revolution (ie. a group of SOVEREIGN states deciding to unite, giving up..BUT NOT PERMANENTLY..their rights to act in ways varient to the other states IF NEED BE...)ended.) reasonable people could only conclude that neither president wanted serious peace negotiations.
the new york herald announced that publication of the president's 'to whom it may concern' letter 'sealed l's fate in the coming presidential campaign'. by making abolition as much a war aim as union, the president gave new strength to the democratic party, preparing for its national convention in chicago at the end of august. opposition leaders declared that letter proved l did not really want to end the war 'even if an honorable peace were within his grasp'. 'all he has a right to require of the south is submission to the constitution', democratic editors announced. they were sure that 'the people of the loyal states will teach him, they will not supply men and treasure to prosecute a war in the interest of the black race'.
the president's letter also undermined his support in his own party. at first, oddly enough, the erosion was most noticeable among the radicals. greeley's animus toward the president increased after his venture into amateur diplomacy became a subject of ridicule. he was not alone. radicals, who should have been pleased by the president's firm insistence on abolition, felt they had lincoln on the run, and they began to express all their pent-up grievances and frustrations at the president's slowness, his timidity, his indecisiveness, his fence-straddling, his incompetence, his leniency toward the rebels. chase, though ostensibly out of politics, spent much of the summer in new england conferring with other anti-l republicans and spreading the news that there was 'great and almost universal dissatisfaction with mr. l among all earnest men'. in boston he frequently conferred with sumner, who grumbled that the country needed 'a president with brains; one who can make a plan and carry it out'. pomeroy, the original head of the chase movement, and wade, coauthor of the reconstruction bill l had just vetoed, joined them for a conference, which, as a newspaper correspondent shrewdly surmised, 'boded no good to Father Abraham'. radical disaffection was not confined to new england. in iowa, grimes concluded: 'this entire administration has been a disgrace from the very beginning to every one who had any thing to do with bringing it into power. i take my full share of the ...shame to myself. i can atone for what i have done no otherwise than in refusing to be instrumental in continuing it'.
on august 5 this dissatisfaction with l exploded with the publication of a protest by wade and henry winter davis against l's 'grave executive usurpation' in pocket-vetoing their reconstruction bill. the congressmen found the president's public message explaining the reasons for his action even more offensive than the veto. 'a more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated',', they fumed; it was a 'blow at the friends of his administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles of republican government'. l must know that 'the authority of congress is paramount and must be respected...; and if he wishes our support, he must confine himself to his executive duties-to obey and execute, not make the laws'.
publication of the wade-davis 'manifesto', as it was generally called, produced a short-lived political commotion. democrats, of course, enjoyed the spectacle of prominent congressional leaders attacking the presidential nominee of their own party, and they congratulated 'the country that two republicans have been found willing at last to resent the encroachments of the executive on the authority of congress'. the manifesto, according to the new york world, was 'a blow between the eyes which will daze the president'. the new york herald, always glad to jab at the administration, called it an acknowledgment that l was 'an egregious failure' who ought 'to retire from the position to which, in an evil hour, he was exalted'. but the rhetoric of the proclamation was so excessive and the accusations against l so extreme that the charges backfired. most republican papers criticized wade and davis more severely than they did the president.
l did not read the manifesto. he had no desire to get involved in a controversy with its authors, he told welles. the attack saddened him and he admitted to noah brooks, 'to be wounded in the house of one's friends' is perhaps the most grievous affliction that can befall a man'. but he refused to brood about it. 'it is not worth fretting about, he joked; it reminds me of an old acquaintance, who, having a son of a scientific turn, bought him a microscope. the boy went around, experimenting with his glass upon everything...one day, at the dinner-table, his father took up a piece of cheese. 'con't eat that, father, said the boy; it is full of wrigglers'. 'my son, replied the old gentleman, taking...a huge bite, let 'em wriggle; i can stand it if they can'.'
less public, but more dangerous to the president, was a radical plan to replace l, already the official nominee of his party, with another candidate who would be more positive and energetic, who would be more deeply committed to equal rights, and who would, presumably, have a greater chance of success. little groups of radicals in boston, cincinnati, and, especially, new york concocted plans for summoning a new republican nominating convention. some of the schemers favored chase; others, butler. few looked to fremont, whose candidacy was already failing and they tried to get him to withdraw from the race on the condition that l did so. most put their hopes on grant.
in a preliminary meeting on august 18, about 25 radicals gathered at the house of mayor george opdyke of new york. the editors of the major newspapers-greeley of the tribune, parke godwin of the evening post, theodore tilton of the independent, and george wildes of the spirit of the times-were present, as were wade, davis, and governor john a. andrew of massachusetts. chase sent his regrets, hoping that the deliberations would be 'fruitful, of the benefit to our country, never more in need of wise words and fearless action by and among patriotic men'. sumner too stayed away. 'i do not as yet see the presidential horizon', he explained. i wait for the blue lights of (the democratic convention at) chicago, which will present the true outlines'. those who did attend-the diarist george templeton strong termed them 'our wire-pullers and secret, unofficial governors'- decided to send out a circular letter calling for a new convention, to be held at cincinnati on sept. 28, which would 'concentrate the union strength on some one candidate who commands the confidence of the country, even by a new nomination if necessary'. less politely davis said that the convention was intended 'to get rid of mr lincoln and name new candidates'. to make final arrangements they promised to meet again on aug. 30.
inevitably reports of these plans reached l's ears. he was neither surprised nor worried by most of the schemes to replace him as the nominee of the republican party, but he was alarmed when he heard that the dissidents were thinking of running grant. he did not think the general had political aspirations but, concluding that he ought to sound him out again, he asked colonel john eaton, who had worked closely with grant in caring for the freedmen in the mississippi valley, to go to the army of the potomac and ascertain his views. at city point, eaton told grant that many people thought he ought to run for president, not as a party man but as a citizens' candidate, in order to save the union. bringing his hand down on the arm of his chair, grant replied: 'they can't do it! they can't compel me to do it!' he went on to say that he considered it 'as important for the cause that (l) should be elected as that the army should be successful in the field'. when eaton reported the conversation to the president, his relief was obvious. 'i told you, he said, they could not get him to run until he had closed out the rebellion'.
in calmer times l would have ignored a semi literate communication form a pennsylvania man who urged him to remember that 'white men is in class number one and black men is in class number two and must be governed by white men forever'. but now, in his irascible mood, he drafted a reply to be sent out over nicolay's signature requesting the writer to inform him 'whether you are either a white man or black one, because in either case, you cannot be regarded as an entirely impartial judge'. 'it may be, the president continued, in an unusual tone of sarcasm, that you belong to a third or fourth class of yellow or red men, in which case the impartiality of your judgment would be more apparant'.
l's sharp temper extended at times even to his closest advisers. montgomery blair, furious because early's (note: a general from the south) men had burned his house in silver spring, denounced the 'poltroons and cowards' responsible for the defenses of washington. halleck, always defensive of professional military men, demanded that the president either endorse 'such wholesale denouncement and accusation' or dismiss blair. l replied that he did not approve the postmaster general's remarks but that his words, which 'may have been hastily said in a moment of vexation at so severe a loss', were not sufficient grounds for removing him. 'i propose continuing to be myself the judge as to when a member of the cabinet shall be dismissed', he said sternly, and he took the unusual step of reading to the entire cabinet a carefully prepared memorandum; 'i must myself be the judge, how long to retain in, and when to remove any of you from, his position. it would greatly pain me to discover any of you endeavoring to procure anothers removal, or, in any way to prejudice him before the public. such endeavor would be a wrong to me; and much worse, a wrong to the country'.
on the more important issue of possible peace negotiations with the confederates, the president was obliged to control his anger. indeed, he gained a certain sardonic (characterized by bitter or scornful derision) from his skillful handling of the question. the prime mover was the erratic and excitable editor of the new york tribune. just as early's men were approaching the capital, greeley wrote l that his 'irrepressible friend' william c. jewett was certain that representatives of the confederate government were on the canadian side of niagara falls with full authority to negotiate a peace. greeley urged the president to explore the possibility, because the country was in such desperate shape. a full and generous announcement of union conditions for ending the war, even if they were not accepted,would remover the 'wide-spread conviction that the government and its prominent supporters are not anxious for peace' and help the republican cause in the fall elections.
correctly l suspected a trap. he could not know why the three confederate emissaries-former mississippi congressman jacob thompson, former alabama senator clement c. clay, and professor james p. holcombe of the university of virginia-were in canada, but his instincts told him that their purpose was not to make peace but to meddle in northern politics with a view to influencing the presidential election.
he could not reject the proposed negotiations outright, even though he thought greeley unreliable and mendacious. but this chosen intermediary of the confederates had the power to shape northern opinion. the new york tribune, widely distributed in the west as well as in the east, boasted the largest national circulation of any newspaper. the editor's letter, which reminded the president 'how intently the people desire any peace consistent with the national integrity and honor' and that an offer of fair terms would 'prove an immense and sorely needed advantage to the national cause', thinly masked a threat to go public in case l turned down this opportunity. if the tribune portrayed the president as flatly rejecting a reasonable peace negotiation, it could do irreparable damage.
shrewdly l solved his problem by naming greeley himself as his emissary to the confederates at niagara and authorizing him to bring to washington under safe conduct 'any person anywhere professing to have any proposition of jefferson davis in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the union and abandonment of slavery'. greeley objected. for all his countrified looks and his shuffling gait, the editor was no fool, and he was unwilling to become 'a confidant, far less an agent in such negotiations'. but the president refused to let him off the hook. 'i not only intend a sincere effort for peace, he wrote greeley, but i intend that you shall be a personal witness that it is made'. when greeley continued to delay, the president expressed disappointment: 'i was not expecting you to send me a letter, but to bring me a man, or men'. he then ordered john hay to accompany greeley to niagara falls, bearing a letter that spelled out the terms on which he was willing to deal with the confederate emissaries.
l himself drafted the letter, consulting only seward. addressed 'to whom it may concern', it read: 'any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole union, and the abandonment of slavery...will be received and considered by the executive government of the united states'. it also offered safe-conduct to the confederate negotiators and 'liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points.'
the letter reflected l's careful balancing of political considerations against military needs. he could best promote his chances in the fall election by requiring only minimal conditions for beginning negotiations with the confederates. if he announced that reunification of the nation was the sole condition for peace, he would cement the alliance that he had been trying for months to build with the war democrats, who loyally supported his efforts to restore the union, even though many of them had reservations about his emancipation policy. if, as he anticipated, jefferson davis rejected this reasonable, lenient offer, these democrats could more easily favor the reelection of a republican president.
but there was an unacceptable military risk in this approach. conceivably the confederates might accept reunion as a condition for discussing peace. if they did, they could propose a cease-fire during the progress of any negotiations, and l knew that the people were so war-weary and exhausted that it would be almost impossible to resume hostilities once arms were laid down. 'an armistice-a cessation of hostilities-is the end of the struggle, and the insurgents would be in peaceable possession of all that has been struggled for'.
consequently he had to appear open to peace negotiations while proposing terms that would make them impossible. the first of his conditions, the restoration of the union, was easy to predict; that was what the war, from the outset, had been about. but the second, requiring 'the abandonment of slavery' as a condition for peace talks, was a surprise. it went considerably beyond his own emancipation proclamation or any law of congress. the emancipation proclamation had freed slaves only in specified areas and had not ended the institution of slavery itself, and congress had just failed to adopt the 13th amendment outlawing slavery. this condition was one l knew the confederates would never accept.
l expected that the confederate emissaries would spurn his offer. when they rushed to print his 'to whom it may concern' letter, in order to show that he had torpedoed meaningful peace talks, he countered by publicizing the report he had just received from james r. gilmore and james f. jaquess, who had recently conducted their own unofficial peace mission to richmond. there jeff davis told them: the war...must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks,...unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. we are not fighting for slavery. we are fighting for independence,-and that, or extermination, we will have'. (note: with the failure of this objective the legal foundation of the american revolution (ie. a group of SOVEREIGN states deciding to unite, giving up..BUT NOT PERMANENTLY..their rights to act in ways varient to the other states IF NEED BE...)ended.) reasonable people could only conclude that neither president wanted serious peace negotiations.
the new york herald announced that publication of the president's 'to whom it may concern' letter 'sealed l's fate in the coming presidential campaign'. by making abolition as much a war aim as union, the president gave new strength to the democratic party, preparing for its national convention in chicago at the end of august. opposition leaders declared that letter proved l did not really want to end the war 'even if an honorable peace were within his grasp'. 'all he has a right to require of the south is submission to the constitution', democratic editors announced. they were sure that 'the people of the loyal states will teach him, they will not supply men and treasure to prosecute a war in the interest of the black race'.
the president's letter also undermined his support in his own party. at first, oddly enough, the erosion was most noticeable among the radicals. greeley's animus toward the president increased after his venture into amateur diplomacy became a subject of ridicule. he was not alone. radicals, who should have been pleased by the president's firm insistence on abolition, felt they had lincoln on the run, and they began to express all their pent-up grievances and frustrations at the president's slowness, his timidity, his indecisiveness, his fence-straddling, his incompetence, his leniency toward the rebels. chase, though ostensibly out of politics, spent much of the summer in new england conferring with other anti-l republicans and spreading the news that there was 'great and almost universal dissatisfaction with mr. l among all earnest men'. in boston he frequently conferred with sumner, who grumbled that the country needed 'a president with brains; one who can make a plan and carry it out'. pomeroy, the original head of the chase movement, and wade, coauthor of the reconstruction bill l had just vetoed, joined them for a conference, which, as a newspaper correspondent shrewdly surmised, 'boded no good to Father Abraham'. radical disaffection was not confined to new england. in iowa, grimes concluded: 'this entire administration has been a disgrace from the very beginning to every one who had any thing to do with bringing it into power. i take my full share of the ...shame to myself. i can atone for what i have done no otherwise than in refusing to be instrumental in continuing it'.
on august 5 this dissatisfaction with l exploded with the publication of a protest by wade and henry winter davis against l's 'grave executive usurpation' in pocket-vetoing their reconstruction bill. the congressmen found the president's public message explaining the reasons for his action even more offensive than the veto. 'a more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated',', they fumed; it was a 'blow at the friends of his administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles of republican government'. l must know that 'the authority of congress is paramount and must be respected...; and if he wishes our support, he must confine himself to his executive duties-to obey and execute, not make the laws'.
publication of the wade-davis 'manifesto', as it was generally called, produced a short-lived political commotion. democrats, of course, enjoyed the spectacle of prominent congressional leaders attacking the presidential nominee of their own party, and they congratulated 'the country that two republicans have been found willing at last to resent the encroachments of the executive on the authority of congress'. the manifesto, according to the new york world, was 'a blow between the eyes which will daze the president'. the new york herald, always glad to jab at the administration, called it an acknowledgment that l was 'an egregious failure' who ought 'to retire from the position to which, in an evil hour, he was exalted'. but the rhetoric of the proclamation was so excessive and the accusations against l so extreme that the charges backfired. most republican papers criticized wade and davis more severely than they did the president.
l did not read the manifesto. he had no desire to get involved in a controversy with its authors, he told welles. the attack saddened him and he admitted to noah brooks, 'to be wounded in the house of one's friends' is perhaps the most grievous affliction that can befall a man'. but he refused to brood about it. 'it is not worth fretting about, he joked; it reminds me of an old acquaintance, who, having a son of a scientific turn, bought him a microscope. the boy went around, experimenting with his glass upon everything...one day, at the dinner-table, his father took up a piece of cheese. 'con't eat that, father, said the boy; it is full of wrigglers'. 'my son, replied the old gentleman, taking...a huge bite, let 'em wriggle; i can stand it if they can'.'
less public, but more dangerous to the president, was a radical plan to replace l, already the official nominee of his party, with another candidate who would be more positive and energetic, who would be more deeply committed to equal rights, and who would, presumably, have a greater chance of success. little groups of radicals in boston, cincinnati, and, especially, new york concocted plans for summoning a new republican nominating convention. some of the schemers favored chase; others, butler. few looked to fremont, whose candidacy was already failing and they tried to get him to withdraw from the race on the condition that l did so. most put their hopes on grant.
in a preliminary meeting on august 18, about 25 radicals gathered at the house of mayor george opdyke of new york. the editors of the major newspapers-greeley of the tribune, parke godwin of the evening post, theodore tilton of the independent, and george wildes of the spirit of the times-were present, as were wade, davis, and governor john a. andrew of massachusetts. chase sent his regrets, hoping that the deliberations would be 'fruitful, of the benefit to our country, never more in need of wise words and fearless action by and among patriotic men'. sumner too stayed away. 'i do not as yet see the presidential horizon', he explained. i wait for the blue lights of (the democratic convention at) chicago, which will present the true outlines'. those who did attend-the diarist george templeton strong termed them 'our wire-pullers and secret, unofficial governors'- decided to send out a circular letter calling for a new convention, to be held at cincinnati on sept. 28, which would 'concentrate the union strength on some one candidate who commands the confidence of the country, even by a new nomination if necessary'. less politely davis said that the convention was intended 'to get rid of mr lincoln and name new candidates'. to make final arrangements they promised to meet again on aug. 30.
inevitably reports of these plans reached l's ears. he was neither surprised nor worried by most of the schemes to replace him as the nominee of the republican party, but he was alarmed when he heard that the dissidents were thinking of running grant. he did not think the general had political aspirations but, concluding that he ought to sound him out again, he asked colonel john eaton, who had worked closely with grant in caring for the freedmen in the mississippi valley, to go to the army of the potomac and ascertain his views. at city point, eaton told grant that many people thought he ought to run for president, not as a party man but as a citizens' candidate, in order to save the union. bringing his hand down on the arm of his chair, grant replied: 'they can't do it! they can't compel me to do it!' he went on to say that he considered it 'as important for the cause that (l) should be elected as that the army should be successful in the field'. when eaton reported the conversation to the president, his relief was obvious. 'i told you, he said, they could not get him to run until he had closed out the rebellion'.
7.5.2012 LINCOLN: HOW EASY TO JUDGE..HOW GOOD NOT TO
under the enormous strain of worry about 2 armies poised for decisive battle, the president's health began to suffer. he had a nightmare about tad, who had accompanied his mother on a shopping trip to philadelphia. his 'ugly deram' feature the pistol he had permitted the boy to have-'big enough to snap caps- but no cartridges or powder'-and he wired mary; 'think you better put tad's pistol away'. a visitor found the president's face told a story of anxiety and weariness, noting 'the drooping eyelids, looking almost swollen; the dark bags beneath the eyes; the deep marks about the large and expressive mouth'. (note: l at this time was nearly beside himself due to the almost complete lack of military success by the north now more than two years into the civil war...)
then, on july 4, finally came the news that l had so long awaited. staying close to the telegraph office in the war department, he learned of a great and bloody battle that had been fought during the three previous days at gettysburg, pennsylavaia. though details were lacking, it appeared that lee had been defeated and was retreating. jubilantly the president issued a press release from the war department announcing this 'great success to the cause of the union' and urging 'that on this day, He whose will, not ours. should ever be done, be everywhere remembered and reverenced with profoundest gratitude'. three days later secretary welles received a dispatch from admiral david dixon porter announcing the fall of vicksburg and rushed to the white house with the news. his face beaming with joy, l cought welles's hand and, throwing his arm around him, exclaimed; 'what can we do for the secretary of the navy for this glorious intelligence;...i cannot, in words, tell you my joy over this result. it is great, mr. welles, it is great!'
...in the east, meade had to fight just one more battle to destroy lee's army, which was trapped between the advancing army of the potomac and the potomac river, swollen with summer rains.
but meade did not advance swiftly and, after a council of war with his senior generals, postponed an attack. lee escaped into virginia. never was l so disappointed and so FURIOUS:
-'if i had gone up there, i could have whipped them myself..
-our army held the war in the hollow of their hand and they would not close it...'
-l took special offense at a dispatch of meade's praising his army for 'driving the invader from our soil'..
-l insisted, 'the whole country is our soil..
-he feared that meade's purpose was not to defeat lee but 'to get the enemy across the river again without a further collision'.
-his anger did not fade quickly.
-weeks later he expressed deep mortification that lee's army had not been destroyed.
-'meade and his army had expended their skill and toil and blood up to the ripe harvest, he grieved, and then allowed it to go to waste'.
-from the depths of his unhappiness he wrote a bitter letter to meade, expressing gratitude for his 'magnificent usccess' at gettysburg but lamenting:
-''my dear general, i do not beleive you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in lee's escape. he was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. as it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely...your golden opportunity is gone, and i am distressed immeasurably because of it'.
-then..characteristically, he did not sign or send the letter.
AS HE COOLED DOWN, he came to recognize that
-he was EXPECTING TOO MUCH of meade.
-at the time the battle of gettysburg began, meade had been in command of the army of the potomac for only 4 days
-and he was working with new and untried subordinates.
-his army had suffered enormous losses during the three days of battle
-and some of its ablest and most aggressive generals were dead or wounded.
-meade himself was exhausted. as he wrote his wife on july 8..
-'now over 10 days, i
have not changed my clothes
have not had a regular night's rest
and many nights not a wink of sleep
and for several days did not even wash my face and hands
no regular food
and all the time in a great state of mental anxiety....
-it was asking too much of him to attack robert e. lee.
l withheld his letter-though he permitted halleck to wire that the escape of lee's army had 'created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the president'. meade promptly submitted his resignation, and halleck was forced to backtrack, saying that his telegram'was not intended as a cnsure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit'.
by this time l had recovered his equanimity and could speak of meade 'as a brave and skillful officer, and a true man', who was responsible for the success at gettysburg. indeed the president's spirits were so high that he composed a doggerel (comic or burlesque, usually loose or irregular in measure), 'Gen. Lees invasion of the North written by himself', which he gave to john hay:
in eighteen sixty three, with pomp,
and mighty swell,
Me and Jeff's Confederacy, went
forth to sack Phil-del,
the Yankees they got arter us, and
giv us particular hell, and we skedaddled back again,
and didn't sack Phil-del.
then, on july 4, finally came the news that l had so long awaited. staying close to the telegraph office in the war department, he learned of a great and bloody battle that had been fought during the three previous days at gettysburg, pennsylavaia. though details were lacking, it appeared that lee had been defeated and was retreating. jubilantly the president issued a press release from the war department announcing this 'great success to the cause of the union' and urging 'that on this day, He whose will, not ours. should ever be done, be everywhere remembered and reverenced with profoundest gratitude'. three days later secretary welles received a dispatch from admiral david dixon porter announcing the fall of vicksburg and rushed to the white house with the news. his face beaming with joy, l cought welles's hand and, throwing his arm around him, exclaimed; 'what can we do for the secretary of the navy for this glorious intelligence;...i cannot, in words, tell you my joy over this result. it is great, mr. welles, it is great!'
...in the east, meade had to fight just one more battle to destroy lee's army, which was trapped between the advancing army of the potomac and the potomac river, swollen with summer rains.
but meade did not advance swiftly and, after a council of war with his senior generals, postponed an attack. lee escaped into virginia. never was l so disappointed and so FURIOUS:
-'if i had gone up there, i could have whipped them myself..
-our army held the war in the hollow of their hand and they would not close it...'
-l took special offense at a dispatch of meade's praising his army for 'driving the invader from our soil'..
-l insisted, 'the whole country is our soil..
-he feared that meade's purpose was not to defeat lee but 'to get the enemy across the river again without a further collision'.
-his anger did not fade quickly.
-weeks later he expressed deep mortification that lee's army had not been destroyed.
-'meade and his army had expended their skill and toil and blood up to the ripe harvest, he grieved, and then allowed it to go to waste'.
-from the depths of his unhappiness he wrote a bitter letter to meade, expressing gratitude for his 'magnificent usccess' at gettysburg but lamenting:
-''my dear general, i do not beleive you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in lee's escape. he was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. as it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely...your golden opportunity is gone, and i am distressed immeasurably because of it'.
-then..characteristically, he did not sign or send the letter.
AS HE COOLED DOWN, he came to recognize that
-he was EXPECTING TOO MUCH of meade.
-at the time the battle of gettysburg began, meade had been in command of the army of the potomac for only 4 days
-and he was working with new and untried subordinates.
-his army had suffered enormous losses during the three days of battle
-and some of its ablest and most aggressive generals were dead or wounded.
-meade himself was exhausted. as he wrote his wife on july 8..
-'now over 10 days, i
have not changed my clothes
have not had a regular night's rest
and many nights not a wink of sleep
and for several days did not even wash my face and hands
no regular food
and all the time in a great state of mental anxiety....
-it was asking too much of him to attack robert e. lee.
l withheld his letter-though he permitted halleck to wire that the escape of lee's army had 'created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the president'. meade promptly submitted his resignation, and halleck was forced to backtrack, saying that his telegram'was not intended as a cnsure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit'.
by this time l had recovered his equanimity and could speak of meade 'as a brave and skillful officer, and a true man', who was responsible for the success at gettysburg. indeed the president's spirits were so high that he composed a doggerel (comic or burlesque, usually loose or irregular in measure), 'Gen. Lees invasion of the North written by himself', which he gave to john hay:
in eighteen sixty three, with pomp,
and mighty swell,
Me and Jeff's Confederacy, went
forth to sack Phil-del,
the Yankees they got arter us, and
giv us particular hell, and we skedaddled back again,
and didn't sack Phil-del.
Thursday, June 28, 2012
6.29.2012 LINCOLN WORKS WITH MEN AND LEARNS
taken from david herbert donald's 'lincoln'..
'..during the months when the president seemed to be on a radical course, it was the conservative republicans who demanded that he reorganize his cabinet. for instance, in early september, samuel galloway warned that the cabinet members' 'selfish purposes (had) over-borne their patriotism' and tried to persuade l to drop chase, whom he considered too radical on the slavery question. even within the cabinet itself, montgomery blair, after consulting with seward, went to the president with a report that the nation was 'going to ruin for the want of a proper head to the war depat.' and begged him to oust stanton.
but after early november most of the demands for cabinet changes came from the radical, antislavery wing of l's party. in calling for a reorganization of the cabinet, radicals often hoped to oust smith, who was 'nothing but a doughface', and bates, who was 'a fossil of the silurian era'. but the chief focus of their attention was seward, who had come to represent everything that was wrong with the l administration. the secretary of state, they alleged, had never had his heart in the war; he had tried to negotiate with the confederate envoys during the secession crisis; he had opposed making a stand at fort sumter; he had been mcClellan's principal defender; he had opposed, and then delayed, the issuance of the emancipation proclamation; he and thurlow weed had undermined the candidacy of radical general wadsworth for governor of new york. the publication in december of seward's diplomatic dispatches to charles francis adams, the american minister in london, gave further evidence that the secretary failed to understand the meaning of the american conflict; as late as july 5, seward denounced both 'the extreme advocated of african slavery and its most vehement opponenets', the abolitionists, as being equally responsible for the civil war. 'seward must be got out of the cabinet', joseph medill of the chicago tribune announced. 'he is l's evil genius. he has been president de facto, and has kept a sponge saturated with chloroform to uncle abe's nose'.
l became aware of the full extent of the hostility to the secretary of state on december 16, three days after the battle of fredericksburg, when a messenger brought him a not from seward; 'i hereby resign the office of secretary of state of the united states, and have the honor to request that this resignation may be immediately accepted'. in identical language frederick w. seward, his son, resigned as assistant secretary of state. with a face full of pain and surprise the president turned to senator preston king of new york, who accompanied the messenger, and asked; 'what does this mean?'
king reported that because of the immense popular excitement over the defeat at fredricksburg there had been an extraordinary caucus of republican senators that afternoon in order 'to ascertain whether any steps could be taken to quiet the public mind and to produce a better condition of affairs'. the real purpose of the caucus became clear when senator wilkinson accused seward of exercising 'a controlling influence upon the mind of the president' and predicted that 'so long as he remained in the cabinet nothing but defeat and disaster could be expected'. senator grimes offered a resolution declaring a want of confidence in the secretary of state and calling for his removal from office. the highly respected jacob collamer argued that 'the president had no cabinet in the true sense of the word', and sharp-spoken william pitt fessenden said that 'there was a back-stairs influence which often controlled the apparent conclusions of the cabinet itself'. he refused to name seward but declared that 'senators might draw their own conclusions'. taken by surprise, the friends of the secretary of state were nevertheless able to prevent unanimous adoption of grimes's resolution of censure. frustrated, seward's opponents pressed for adjournment until the next day and, by a vote of 16 to 13, got their way.
king had not stayed for the final vote but went immediately to seward's house, where he repeated the proceedings to the secretary. 'they may do as they please about me, but they shall not put the president in a false position on my account', said seward. he wrote out a letter of resignation.
that evening the president called at seward's house but found the secretary resolute in his determination to resign. he wired his family, who had been planning to join him in the capital, not to come, and he and his son began packing up their books and papers in preparation for a return to his home in auburn, new york.
keeping seward's resignation secret during the next two days , the president anxiously awaited the outcome of the republican caucus. for months the radicals in this group had been in frequent contact with secretary chase, who fed them stories of l's failure to consult with his cabinet advisers. for instance, he told zachariah chandler that there was 'at the present time no cabinet except in name'; though the heads of departments met now and then, 'no reparts are made; no regular discussions held; no ascertained conclusions reached'. chase was also the source of fessenden's statement about seward's 'back-stairs' influence at the white house. believing chase's rumors, the caucus agreed on a resolution calling for 'a change in and a partial reconstruction of the cabinet'. the senators then voted unanimously-with only two republican senators absent, and senator king not voting-to name a committee to present their views to the president.
l, who had a good idea of what went on in the caucus, was in anguish because of this new assault, coming so close after the devastating news from fredericksburg. when he met browning in the afternoon of december 18, he asked, 'what do these men want?' and he answered himself; 'they wish to get rid of me, and i am sometimes half disposed to gratify them'. 'we are now on the brink of destruction..it appears to me the Almighty is against us, and i can hardly see a ray of hope'.
but when the committee representing the senate caucus called at the white house at seven o'clock that evening, he had regained his composure, and he greeted his visitors with what fessenden called 'his usual urbanity'. patiently he listened as collamer, the chairman of the committee, read resolutions that the senators had agreed on, which, in very general terms and without mentioning any names, called for changes in the composition of the cabinet so that its members would agree with the president 'in political principles and general policy' and urged that no important military command should go to anyone who was not 'a cordial believer and supporter of the same principles'.
wade then bluntly censured l for entrusting the conduct of the war to 'men who had no sympathy with it or the cause' and blamed republican defeats in the recent elections on 'the fact that the president had placed the direction of our military affairs in the hands of bitter and malignant democrats'.
after professing confidence in the integrity and patriotism of the president, fessenden alleged 'that the cabinet were not consulted as a council-in fact, that many important measures were decided upon not only without consultation, but without the knowledge of its members'. seward, he claimed, exerted an injurious influence upon the conduct of the war. branching out in his indictment, he went on to say that the commanders of the armies were 'largely pro-slavery men and sympathized strongly with the southern feeling', and some of them, like mcClellan, had use their position to blame the administration for failing to support them and their men.
at this point l interrupted. from his long experience in the courtroom he knew the value of a well-timed digression as a way of defusing hostility. if the occasion had not been so serious, he might have told the senators an anecdote. instead, producing a large bundle of papers, he spent nearly half an hour in reading aloud his letters to mcClellan, showing that the government had consistently sustained him to the best of its powers.
by the time the senators got back to their main subject, their tempers had cooled and nobody got very excited about sumner's charge that seward had written offensive diplomatic dispatches, 'which the president could not have seen or assented to'.
after three hours the meeting broke up without taking any action. by the end of the session the president was, as fessenden thought, 'apparently in cheerful spirits', and he promised to give careful consideration to the resolutions submitted by the committee. as they left the white house, radical republicans were exultant 'at the prospect of getting rid of the WHOLE CABINET' and chandler rejoiced with 'our best and truest men' that they were going to oust seward, 'the millstone around the administration'.
the president had other plans. the next morning at a cabinet meeting were all members except seward were present, he reported on the resignation of the secretary of state and on his visit from the committee representing the republican caucus. he observed that they considered seward 'the real cause of our failures'. 'while they believed in the president's honesty, he said in his quaint language, 'they seemed to think that when he had in him any good purposes mr. seward) contrived to suck them out of him unperceived'. he then asked the cabinet members to meet with him again, 'to have a free talk', that evening at seven thirty.
the committee was invited for the same hour and as senators and cabinet members met in the anteroom, they exchanged looks of wild surmise. (to conjecture or guess) the president began the meeting with a long statement, commenting 'with some mild severity' on the resolutions presented by the senators the previous evening, admitting that he had not been very regular in consulting the cabinet as a whole, but arguing 'that most questions of importance had received a reasonable consideration' and that he 'was not aware of any divisions or want of unity'. he then called on the members of the cabinet to state 'whether there had been any want of unity or of sufficient consultation'.
most of the cabinet members unhesitatingly agreed that they had indeed been consulted on important matters, but chase was in a very embarrassing position. if he now repeated his frequent complaints to the senators, his disloyalty to the president would be apparent. if he supported l's statement, it would be evident that he had deceived the senators. chase tried to get out of the trap by blustering' that he should not have come here had he known that he was to be arraigned before a committee of the senat'. but finding no escape, he swallowed both truth and consistency and averred 'that questions of importance had generally been considered by the cabinet, though perhaps not so fully as might have been desired' and that there was no want of unity in the cabinet.
the meeting went on for some time after that, as senators repeated all the familiar charges against seward, but it was evident that chase's forced admission had undercut the case against the secretary of state. at one o'clock, when the senators and the cabinet officers left the whit house, no conclusion had been reached, but there was a general feeling that there would be no changes in the cabinet.
chase began to realize that his position was untenable and wrote out his resignation as secretary of the treasury. the next morning when l summoned him to the white house, he brought the letter with him. he, along with stanton and welles, was already in the executive office when the president arrived. turning at once to the treasury secretary, l said; ' i sent for you, for this matter is giving me great trouble'. chase stammered that he, too, had been painfully affected by the meeting the previous night and that he had prepared his resignation.
where is it? asked l quickly. 'i brought it with me,' said chase, taking a paper from his pocket. 'i wrote it this morning'.
'let me have it', said l, his long arm and fingers reaching out for the document, which chase was apparently reluctant to release. evidently the secretary intended to say more, but l took the letter and opened it. 'this...cuts the gordian knot' he said with a triumphant laugh. 'i can dispose of this subject now'.
then stanton offered his resignation, but l brushed him aside. 'you may go to your department' he told the secretary of war. 'i don't want yours'. then he ended the interview abruptly; 'i will detain neither of you longer.
having both seward's resignation and chase's in his hand, the president declined to accept either and insisted that both men remain in his cabinet. they balanced each other, he told senator ira harris of new york. remembering how as a boy in indiana he had worked out a way to carry pumpkins while he was on horseback, he told the senator: 'i can ride on now. i've got a pumpkin in each end of my bag!'
'..during the months when the president seemed to be on a radical course, it was the conservative republicans who demanded that he reorganize his cabinet. for instance, in early september, samuel galloway warned that the cabinet members' 'selfish purposes (had) over-borne their patriotism' and tried to persuade l to drop chase, whom he considered too radical on the slavery question. even within the cabinet itself, montgomery blair, after consulting with seward, went to the president with a report that the nation was 'going to ruin for the want of a proper head to the war depat.' and begged him to oust stanton.
but after early november most of the demands for cabinet changes came from the radical, antislavery wing of l's party. in calling for a reorganization of the cabinet, radicals often hoped to oust smith, who was 'nothing but a doughface', and bates, who was 'a fossil of the silurian era'. but the chief focus of their attention was seward, who had come to represent everything that was wrong with the l administration. the secretary of state, they alleged, had never had his heart in the war; he had tried to negotiate with the confederate envoys during the secession crisis; he had opposed making a stand at fort sumter; he had been mcClellan's principal defender; he had opposed, and then delayed, the issuance of the emancipation proclamation; he and thurlow weed had undermined the candidacy of radical general wadsworth for governor of new york. the publication in december of seward's diplomatic dispatches to charles francis adams, the american minister in london, gave further evidence that the secretary failed to understand the meaning of the american conflict; as late as july 5, seward denounced both 'the extreme advocated of african slavery and its most vehement opponenets', the abolitionists, as being equally responsible for the civil war. 'seward must be got out of the cabinet', joseph medill of the chicago tribune announced. 'he is l's evil genius. he has been president de facto, and has kept a sponge saturated with chloroform to uncle abe's nose'.
l became aware of the full extent of the hostility to the secretary of state on december 16, three days after the battle of fredericksburg, when a messenger brought him a not from seward; 'i hereby resign the office of secretary of state of the united states, and have the honor to request that this resignation may be immediately accepted'. in identical language frederick w. seward, his son, resigned as assistant secretary of state. with a face full of pain and surprise the president turned to senator preston king of new york, who accompanied the messenger, and asked; 'what does this mean?'
king reported that because of the immense popular excitement over the defeat at fredricksburg there had been an extraordinary caucus of republican senators that afternoon in order 'to ascertain whether any steps could be taken to quiet the public mind and to produce a better condition of affairs'. the real purpose of the caucus became clear when senator wilkinson accused seward of exercising 'a controlling influence upon the mind of the president' and predicted that 'so long as he remained in the cabinet nothing but defeat and disaster could be expected'. senator grimes offered a resolution declaring a want of confidence in the secretary of state and calling for his removal from office. the highly respected jacob collamer argued that 'the president had no cabinet in the true sense of the word', and sharp-spoken william pitt fessenden said that 'there was a back-stairs influence which often controlled the apparent conclusions of the cabinet itself'. he refused to name seward but declared that 'senators might draw their own conclusions'. taken by surprise, the friends of the secretary of state were nevertheless able to prevent unanimous adoption of grimes's resolution of censure. frustrated, seward's opponents pressed for adjournment until the next day and, by a vote of 16 to 13, got their way.
king had not stayed for the final vote but went immediately to seward's house, where he repeated the proceedings to the secretary. 'they may do as they please about me, but they shall not put the president in a false position on my account', said seward. he wrote out a letter of resignation.
that evening the president called at seward's house but found the secretary resolute in his determination to resign. he wired his family, who had been planning to join him in the capital, not to come, and he and his son began packing up their books and papers in preparation for a return to his home in auburn, new york.
keeping seward's resignation secret during the next two days , the president anxiously awaited the outcome of the republican caucus. for months the radicals in this group had been in frequent contact with secretary chase, who fed them stories of l's failure to consult with his cabinet advisers. for instance, he told zachariah chandler that there was 'at the present time no cabinet except in name'; though the heads of departments met now and then, 'no reparts are made; no regular discussions held; no ascertained conclusions reached'. chase was also the source of fessenden's statement about seward's 'back-stairs' influence at the white house. believing chase's rumors, the caucus agreed on a resolution calling for 'a change in and a partial reconstruction of the cabinet'. the senators then voted unanimously-with only two republican senators absent, and senator king not voting-to name a committee to present their views to the president.
l, who had a good idea of what went on in the caucus, was in anguish because of this new assault, coming so close after the devastating news from fredericksburg. when he met browning in the afternoon of december 18, he asked, 'what do these men want?' and he answered himself; 'they wish to get rid of me, and i am sometimes half disposed to gratify them'. 'we are now on the brink of destruction..it appears to me the Almighty is against us, and i can hardly see a ray of hope'.
but when the committee representing the senate caucus called at the white house at seven o'clock that evening, he had regained his composure, and he greeted his visitors with what fessenden called 'his usual urbanity'. patiently he listened as collamer, the chairman of the committee, read resolutions that the senators had agreed on, which, in very general terms and without mentioning any names, called for changes in the composition of the cabinet so that its members would agree with the president 'in political principles and general policy' and urged that no important military command should go to anyone who was not 'a cordial believer and supporter of the same principles'.
wade then bluntly censured l for entrusting the conduct of the war to 'men who had no sympathy with it or the cause' and blamed republican defeats in the recent elections on 'the fact that the president had placed the direction of our military affairs in the hands of bitter and malignant democrats'.
after professing confidence in the integrity and patriotism of the president, fessenden alleged 'that the cabinet were not consulted as a council-in fact, that many important measures were decided upon not only without consultation, but without the knowledge of its members'. seward, he claimed, exerted an injurious influence upon the conduct of the war. branching out in his indictment, he went on to say that the commanders of the armies were 'largely pro-slavery men and sympathized strongly with the southern feeling', and some of them, like mcClellan, had use their position to blame the administration for failing to support them and their men.
at this point l interrupted. from his long experience in the courtroom he knew the value of a well-timed digression as a way of defusing hostility. if the occasion had not been so serious, he might have told the senators an anecdote. instead, producing a large bundle of papers, he spent nearly half an hour in reading aloud his letters to mcClellan, showing that the government had consistently sustained him to the best of its powers.
by the time the senators got back to their main subject, their tempers had cooled and nobody got very excited about sumner's charge that seward had written offensive diplomatic dispatches, 'which the president could not have seen or assented to'.
after three hours the meeting broke up without taking any action. by the end of the session the president was, as fessenden thought, 'apparently in cheerful spirits', and he promised to give careful consideration to the resolutions submitted by the committee. as they left the white house, radical republicans were exultant 'at the prospect of getting rid of the WHOLE CABINET' and chandler rejoiced with 'our best and truest men' that they were going to oust seward, 'the millstone around the administration'.
the president had other plans. the next morning at a cabinet meeting were all members except seward were present, he reported on the resignation of the secretary of state and on his visit from the committee representing the republican caucus. he observed that they considered seward 'the real cause of our failures'. 'while they believed in the president's honesty, he said in his quaint language, 'they seemed to think that when he had in him any good purposes mr. seward) contrived to suck them out of him unperceived'. he then asked the cabinet members to meet with him again, 'to have a free talk', that evening at seven thirty.
the committee was invited for the same hour and as senators and cabinet members met in the anteroom, they exchanged looks of wild surmise. (to conjecture or guess) the president began the meeting with a long statement, commenting 'with some mild severity' on the resolutions presented by the senators the previous evening, admitting that he had not been very regular in consulting the cabinet as a whole, but arguing 'that most questions of importance had received a reasonable consideration' and that he 'was not aware of any divisions or want of unity'. he then called on the members of the cabinet to state 'whether there had been any want of unity or of sufficient consultation'.
most of the cabinet members unhesitatingly agreed that they had indeed been consulted on important matters, but chase was in a very embarrassing position. if he now repeated his frequent complaints to the senators, his disloyalty to the president would be apparent. if he supported l's statement, it would be evident that he had deceived the senators. chase tried to get out of the trap by blustering' that he should not have come here had he known that he was to be arraigned before a committee of the senat'. but finding no escape, he swallowed both truth and consistency and averred 'that questions of importance had generally been considered by the cabinet, though perhaps not so fully as might have been desired' and that there was no want of unity in the cabinet.
the meeting went on for some time after that, as senators repeated all the familiar charges against seward, but it was evident that chase's forced admission had undercut the case against the secretary of state. at one o'clock, when the senators and the cabinet officers left the whit house, no conclusion had been reached, but there was a general feeling that there would be no changes in the cabinet.
chase began to realize that his position was untenable and wrote out his resignation as secretary of the treasury. the next morning when l summoned him to the white house, he brought the letter with him. he, along with stanton and welles, was already in the executive office when the president arrived. turning at once to the treasury secretary, l said; ' i sent for you, for this matter is giving me great trouble'. chase stammered that he, too, had been painfully affected by the meeting the previous night and that he had prepared his resignation.
where is it? asked l quickly. 'i brought it with me,' said chase, taking a paper from his pocket. 'i wrote it this morning'.
'let me have it', said l, his long arm and fingers reaching out for the document, which chase was apparently reluctant to release. evidently the secretary intended to say more, but l took the letter and opened it. 'this...cuts the gordian knot' he said with a triumphant laugh. 'i can dispose of this subject now'.
then stanton offered his resignation, but l brushed him aside. 'you may go to your department' he told the secretary of war. 'i don't want yours'. then he ended the interview abruptly; 'i will detain neither of you longer.
having both seward's resignation and chase's in his hand, the president declined to accept either and insisted that both men remain in his cabinet. they balanced each other, he told senator ira harris of new york. remembering how as a boy in indiana he had worked out a way to carry pumpkins while he was on horseback, he told the senator: 'i can ride on now. i've got a pumpkin in each end of my bag!'
6.28.2012 LINCOLN'S PASSIVISM
this is taken from 'lincoln' by david herbert donald. Lincoln seems a man, more than any i have ever known or known about, who combines the ability do act with great power in the lowliest manner. often i find myself silently weeping as i read of something he says, the manner in which he goes about a matter, his patient suffering...he has a wiff of Jesus about him that is beautiful to me.
this author portrays him in a way i have yet to encounter. his thesis is to attempt to understand why lincoln related to events in the way he did. it is wholly different than other lincoln books i have read. it has
1. helped me to understand the civil war much better as to how it actually progressed.
2. it has shown lincoln, who, to this time i was of the hopeful opinion that he was a follower of Christ, in a way that makes me think not so certainly in that direction. the author states that in the crisis of the presidency his references to God increased and seemingly his faith in God increased also. he never was a member of a church and rarely attended is my understanding...i hope to see him in when, by God's grace, i may come there.
below is what the author feels is the key to understanding Lincoln in his handling of circumstances and situations he encountered..
'..this biography highlights a basic trait of character evident throughout l's life; the essential passivity of his nature. l himself recognized it in a letter he wrote on april 4, 1864, to albert g. hodges, a fellow kentuckian, who asked him to explain why he had shifted from his inaugural pledge not to interfere with slavery to a policy of emancipation. after relating how circumstances had obliged him to change his mind- how emancipation and the use of african-american soldiers had become military necessities-the president concluded; 'in telling this tale i attempt no compliment to my own sagacity. i claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me'.
from his earliest days LINCOLN HAD A SENSE THAT HIS DESTINY WAS CONTROLLED BY SOME LARGER FORCE, some higher power. turning away from orthodox christianity because of the emotional excesses of frontier evangelicalism, he found it easier as a young man to accept what was called the Doctrine of Necessity, which he defined as the belief 'that the human mind is impelled to action, or held in rest by some power, over which the mind itself has no control'. later he frequently quoted to his patner, william h. herndon, the lines from hamlet;
there's a divinity that shapes our ends,
rough-hew them how we will.
from l's fatalism derived some of his most lovable traits; his compassion, his tolerance, his willingness to overlook mistakes. that belief did not, of course, lead him to lethargy or diddipation. like thousands of calvinists who believed in predestination, he worked indefatigably for a better world-for himself, for his family, and for his nation. but it helped to buffer the many reverses that he experience and enabled him to continue a strenuous life of aspiration.
it also made for a pragmatic approach to problems, a recognition that if one solution was fated not to work another could be tried. 'my policy is to have no policy' became a kind of moto for l-a motto that infuriated the sober, doctrinaire people around him who were inclined to think that the president had no principles either. he might have offended his critics less if he had more often used the analogy he gave james g. blaine when explaining his course on Reconstruction: 'the pilots on our western rivers steer from POINT TO POINT as they call it-setting the course of the boat no farther than they can see; and that is all i propose to myself in this great problem'.
both statements suggest l's reluctance to take the initiative and make bold plans; HE PREFERRED TO RESPOND TO THE ACTIONS OF OTHERS. they also show why l in his own distinctively american way had the quality john keats defined as forming 'a man of achievement', that quality 'which shakespeare possessed so enormously...Negative Capability, that is WHEN A MAN IS CAPABLE OF BEING IN UNCERTAINTIES, MYSTERIES , DOUBTS, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason'.
this author portrays him in a way i have yet to encounter. his thesis is to attempt to understand why lincoln related to events in the way he did. it is wholly different than other lincoln books i have read. it has
1. helped me to understand the civil war much better as to how it actually progressed.
2. it has shown lincoln, who, to this time i was of the hopeful opinion that he was a follower of Christ, in a way that makes me think not so certainly in that direction. the author states that in the crisis of the presidency his references to God increased and seemingly his faith in God increased also. he never was a member of a church and rarely attended is my understanding...i hope to see him in when, by God's grace, i may come there.
below is what the author feels is the key to understanding Lincoln in his handling of circumstances and situations he encountered..
'..this biography highlights a basic trait of character evident throughout l's life; the essential passivity of his nature. l himself recognized it in a letter he wrote on april 4, 1864, to albert g. hodges, a fellow kentuckian, who asked him to explain why he had shifted from his inaugural pledge not to interfere with slavery to a policy of emancipation. after relating how circumstances had obliged him to change his mind- how emancipation and the use of african-american soldiers had become military necessities-the president concluded; 'in telling this tale i attempt no compliment to my own sagacity. i claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me'.
from his earliest days LINCOLN HAD A SENSE THAT HIS DESTINY WAS CONTROLLED BY SOME LARGER FORCE, some higher power. turning away from orthodox christianity because of the emotional excesses of frontier evangelicalism, he found it easier as a young man to accept what was called the Doctrine of Necessity, which he defined as the belief 'that the human mind is impelled to action, or held in rest by some power, over which the mind itself has no control'. later he frequently quoted to his patner, william h. herndon, the lines from hamlet;
there's a divinity that shapes our ends,
rough-hew them how we will.
from l's fatalism derived some of his most lovable traits; his compassion, his tolerance, his willingness to overlook mistakes. that belief did not, of course, lead him to lethargy or diddipation. like thousands of calvinists who believed in predestination, he worked indefatigably for a better world-for himself, for his family, and for his nation. but it helped to buffer the many reverses that he experience and enabled him to continue a strenuous life of aspiration.
it also made for a pragmatic approach to problems, a recognition that if one solution was fated not to work another could be tried. 'my policy is to have no policy' became a kind of moto for l-a motto that infuriated the sober, doctrinaire people around him who were inclined to think that the president had no principles either. he might have offended his critics less if he had more often used the analogy he gave james g. blaine when explaining his course on Reconstruction: 'the pilots on our western rivers steer from POINT TO POINT as they call it-setting the course of the boat no farther than they can see; and that is all i propose to myself in this great problem'.
both statements suggest l's reluctance to take the initiative and make bold plans; HE PREFERRED TO RESPOND TO THE ACTIONS OF OTHERS. they also show why l in his own distinctively american way had the quality john keats defined as forming 'a man of achievement', that quality 'which shakespeare possessed so enormously...Negative Capability, that is WHEN A MAN IS CAPABLE OF BEING IN UNCERTAINTIES, MYSTERIES , DOUBTS, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason'.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)