...his worst fear, which he repeatedly expressed, was that once the confederate armies were defeated southern soldiers 'would not return to their homes to accept citizenship under a hated rule; and with nothing but desolation and want through the south, the disbanded confederate soldiers would be tempted to lawlessness and anarchy'. consequently his objective was to secure not merely peace but reconciliation. bringing grant, sherman, and admiral david d. porter together for a conference aboard the river queen on march 28, l discussed the approaching end of the war and talked of offering the most generous terms in order to 'get the deluded men of the rebel men of the rebel armies disarmed and back to their homes'. 'let them once surrender and reach their homes, he said, (and) they won't take up arms again. let them all go, officers and all, i want submission, and no more bloodshed...i want no one punished; treat them liberally all round. we want those people to return to their allegiance to the union and submit to the laws'.
...he contemplated giving a limited recognition to interim governments for the specific purpose of withdrawing troops from the confederate armies. he had returned from city point with a new sense of urgency about reconstruction. he now had firsthand knowledge of the devastation wrought by the war and a fuller understanding of the suffering it had cause soldiers and civilians in the south. more strongly than ever he felt that immediate action must be taken to restore stability in the conquered region. 'civil government must be established...as soon as possible, he told welles; there must be courts and law and order or society would be broken up, the disbanded armies would turn into robber bands and guerrillas, which we must strive to prevent'.
Sunday, July 8, 2012
7.8.2012 INAUGURATION DAY, MARCH 4, 1865
...began wet and windy. it had been raining for several days in washington and the streets were a sea of mud at least 10 inches deep. during the previous week delegations from all parts of the country had been arriving in the capital, and all the hotels were full, with willard's accommodating overflow guests on cots in the hallways and parlors. despite the abominable weather, a crowd began to gather at the east front of the capitol before ten o'clock, and by the time the ceremonies began at noon, the spectators were sodden. women, wearing their long, cumbersome dresses, were in a 'most wretched, wretched plight', noah brooks observed; crinoline was smashed, skirts bedaubed, and moire antique, velvet, laces, and such dry goods were streaked with mud from end to end'.
first came the swearing in of the vice president, which took place in the senate chamber. andrew johnson had hoped to remain in tennessee to witness the installation of a new, loyal state government under a constitution with 'the foul blot of slavery erased from her escutcheon' (a shield or shieldlike surface upon which a coat of arms is portrayed), but l and his advisers felt that it was unsafe for him not to be in washington on march 4. exhausted from the long trip, unsteady from a recent bout of typhoid fever, johnson asked for some whiskey to calm his v=nerves. he was especially sensitive to alcohol, and the drink went to his head. in a long, maudlin (tearfully or weakly emotional) speech he boasted of his plebeian origins and reminded the embarrassed members of the supreme court, the cabinet, and even the diplomatic corps-'with all your fine feathers and gewgaws'-that they were but creatures of the people. l had to sit silently through johnson's ramblings and on observer noted that he 'closed his eyes and seemed to retire into himself as though beset by melancholy reflections'. when johnson finally finished and took the oath, the president leaned over to the parade marshal and whispered, 'do not let johnson speak outside'.
then the presidential party moved onto the platform at the east front of the capitol as l's tall figure appeared, 'cheer upon cheer arose, bands blatted (bleat) upon the air, and flags waved all over the scene'. after the sergeant-at-arms of the senate quieted the crowd, the president stepped forward holding a half sheet of foolscap on which his inaugural address was printed in 2 columns. at just that moment the sun burst through the clouds and flooded the scene with light; chief justice chase saw it as 'an auspicious omen of the dispersion of the clouds of war and the restoration of the clear sunlight of prosperous peace'.
in his clear, high-pitched voice that reached even the outer edges of the huge crowd. l read one of the shortest inaugural address in american history (703 words) and also the most memorable. he began by reminding his listeners that at this time there was 'less occasion for an extended address' outlining policy than there had been at his firs inauguration. during the past 4 years of war, he noted in a tone of weariness, 'public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest'. consequently he could devote the larger part of his address to an explanation of the origins of the conflict and an examination of its significance.
it was a remarkably impersonal address. after the opening paragraph, l did not use the first-person-singular pronoun, nor did he refer to anything he had said or done during the previous 4 years. notably lacking from his brief account of how the war began was any attribution of blame. 'all dreaded it-all sought to avert it'. but one of the parties to the conflict -throughout, he carefully avoided referring to the south or the confederacy-would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish'. interrupted by a burst of applause at this point, l continued, 'and the war came'. slavery was 'somehow, the cause of the war'. it was the one institution that divide the nation. the people of both sections had shared values; they 'read the same bible, and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other'. in his one deviation from impartiality between the sections, l felt obliged to remark that ' it may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces, but he promptly added, let us judge not that we be not judged'.
l then sought, bot for himself and for the american people, an explanation of why the war was so protracted. his answer showed no trace of any late-at-night anguish over his own responsibility for the conflict. if there was guilt, the burden had been shifted from his shoulders to those of a Higher Power. the war continued because 'the Almighty has His own purposes', which are different from men's purposes. this, l said later was 'a truth which i though needed to be told', because to deny it was 'to deny that there is a God governing the world'.
he might have put his argument in terms of the doctrine of necessity, in which he had long believed; but that was not a dogma accepted by most americans. in an earlier private meditation he had concluded that it was 'probably true-that God wills this contest, and wills that it shall not end', thinking it 'quite possible that God's purpose is something different from the purpose of either party' to the conflict. but that was to gnostic (understood by or meant for only a select few who have special knowledge) a doctrine to gain general credence. addressing a devout, bible-reading public, l knew he would be understood when he invoked the familiar doctrine of exact retribution, the belief that the punishment for a violation of God's law would equal the offense itself. quoting from matthew, he announced, 'woe unto the world because of offences! for it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh!' that warning might seem to apply only to slaveholders, but l had consistently held northerners as well as southerners responsible for introducing slavery and for protecting it under the constitution. consequently, as God now willed to remove the offense of slavery, He gave to both north and south, this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offence came'.
how long, then, would the war last, and when would retribution cease? in the summer of 1864, l had said that the war might go on for 3 more years. more recently he had spoken of another year, or at least another 100 days, of fighting. now he offered no promises. early in the address he said flatly, 'with high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured'. returning to the subject, he made no firmer pledge: 'fondly do we hope-fervently do we pray-that this might scourge of war may speedily pass away'. then he went on to add one of the most terrible statements ever made by an american public official:'
'ye, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-man's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, "the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether" .'
this was a harsh doctrine, but it was one that absolved both the south and the north of guilt for the never ending bloodshed. and, by leaving the execution of this sanguinary judgment to the Almighty, l could turn in his final paragraph to the more limited responsibilities of mortals. here he had a chance to voice his deeply held sense of the nations's debt to those who had fought, suffered, and died in the army and navy. recently he had expressed that feeling..to mrs. lydia bixby, a boston widow who, he was told, was 'the mother of 5 sons who have died gloriously on the field of battle'. 'i pray that our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, he wrote her, and leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and lost, and the solemn pride that must be yours, to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom'. now he returned to that theme, promising '[to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan'.
with soaring eloquence l concluded his address: 'with malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; ...to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations'.
after immense applause, l turned to chief justice chase, and, laying his right hand on an open page of the bible, repeated after him the oath of office, ending with an emphatic 'so help me God!' he then kissed the bible and, as a salvo of artillery boomed and the crowd cheered, he began his second term.
except for copperhead journals like the chicago times, which denounced the speech as 'so slop shod, so loose-joined, so puerile' that 'by the side of it, mediocrity is superb', most newspapers gave l's second inaugural address a respectful if somewhat puzzled reception. in general english editors praise it more highly than did the americans. but the washington national intelligencer felt the president's final words, 'equally distinguished for patriotism, statesmanship and benevolence', deserved ' be printed in gold'.
l was not troubled that his address was not immediately popular. he recognized that ' men are not flattered by being shown that there has been a difference of purpose between the Almighty and them;. but he was pleased when it received praise. he positively beamed when frederick douglass, who was in the throng at the white house reception after the inauguration pronounced it 'a sacred effort'. as l told thurlow weed, he expected it 'to wear as well as-perhaps better than-anything i have produced'. 'lots of wisdom in that document, i suspect,' as he filed away his manuscript.
first came the swearing in of the vice president, which took place in the senate chamber. andrew johnson had hoped to remain in tennessee to witness the installation of a new, loyal state government under a constitution with 'the foul blot of slavery erased from her escutcheon' (a shield or shieldlike surface upon which a coat of arms is portrayed), but l and his advisers felt that it was unsafe for him not to be in washington on march 4. exhausted from the long trip, unsteady from a recent bout of typhoid fever, johnson asked for some whiskey to calm his v=nerves. he was especially sensitive to alcohol, and the drink went to his head. in a long, maudlin (tearfully or weakly emotional) speech he boasted of his plebeian origins and reminded the embarrassed members of the supreme court, the cabinet, and even the diplomatic corps-'with all your fine feathers and gewgaws'-that they were but creatures of the people. l had to sit silently through johnson's ramblings and on observer noted that he 'closed his eyes and seemed to retire into himself as though beset by melancholy reflections'. when johnson finally finished and took the oath, the president leaned over to the parade marshal and whispered, 'do not let johnson speak outside'.
then the presidential party moved onto the platform at the east front of the capitol as l's tall figure appeared, 'cheer upon cheer arose, bands blatted (bleat) upon the air, and flags waved all over the scene'. after the sergeant-at-arms of the senate quieted the crowd, the president stepped forward holding a half sheet of foolscap on which his inaugural address was printed in 2 columns. at just that moment the sun burst through the clouds and flooded the scene with light; chief justice chase saw it as 'an auspicious omen of the dispersion of the clouds of war and the restoration of the clear sunlight of prosperous peace'.
in his clear, high-pitched voice that reached even the outer edges of the huge crowd. l read one of the shortest inaugural address in american history (703 words) and also the most memorable. he began by reminding his listeners that at this time there was 'less occasion for an extended address' outlining policy than there had been at his firs inauguration. during the past 4 years of war, he noted in a tone of weariness, 'public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest'. consequently he could devote the larger part of his address to an explanation of the origins of the conflict and an examination of its significance.
it was a remarkably impersonal address. after the opening paragraph, l did not use the first-person-singular pronoun, nor did he refer to anything he had said or done during the previous 4 years. notably lacking from his brief account of how the war began was any attribution of blame. 'all dreaded it-all sought to avert it'. but one of the parties to the conflict -throughout, he carefully avoided referring to the south or the confederacy-would make war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish'. interrupted by a burst of applause at this point, l continued, 'and the war came'. slavery was 'somehow, the cause of the war'. it was the one institution that divide the nation. the people of both sections had shared values; they 'read the same bible, and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other'. in his one deviation from impartiality between the sections, l felt obliged to remark that ' it may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces, but he promptly added, let us judge not that we be not judged'.
l then sought, bot for himself and for the american people, an explanation of why the war was so protracted. his answer showed no trace of any late-at-night anguish over his own responsibility for the conflict. if there was guilt, the burden had been shifted from his shoulders to those of a Higher Power. the war continued because 'the Almighty has His own purposes', which are different from men's purposes. this, l said later was 'a truth which i though needed to be told', because to deny it was 'to deny that there is a God governing the world'.
he might have put his argument in terms of the doctrine of necessity, in which he had long believed; but that was not a dogma accepted by most americans. in an earlier private meditation he had concluded that it was 'probably true-that God wills this contest, and wills that it shall not end', thinking it 'quite possible that God's purpose is something different from the purpose of either party' to the conflict. but that was to gnostic (understood by or meant for only a select few who have special knowledge) a doctrine to gain general credence. addressing a devout, bible-reading public, l knew he would be understood when he invoked the familiar doctrine of exact retribution, the belief that the punishment for a violation of God's law would equal the offense itself. quoting from matthew, he announced, 'woe unto the world because of offences! for it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh!' that warning might seem to apply only to slaveholders, but l had consistently held northerners as well as southerners responsible for introducing slavery and for protecting it under the constitution. consequently, as God now willed to remove the offense of slavery, He gave to both north and south, this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offence came'.
how long, then, would the war last, and when would retribution cease? in the summer of 1864, l had said that the war might go on for 3 more years. more recently he had spoken of another year, or at least another 100 days, of fighting. now he offered no promises. early in the address he said flatly, 'with high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured'. returning to the subject, he made no firmer pledge: 'fondly do we hope-fervently do we pray-that this might scourge of war may speedily pass away'. then he went on to add one of the most terrible statements ever made by an american public official:'
'ye, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-man's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, "the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether" .'
this was a harsh doctrine, but it was one that absolved both the south and the north of guilt for the never ending bloodshed. and, by leaving the execution of this sanguinary judgment to the Almighty, l could turn in his final paragraph to the more limited responsibilities of mortals. here he had a chance to voice his deeply held sense of the nations's debt to those who had fought, suffered, and died in the army and navy. recently he had expressed that feeling..to mrs. lydia bixby, a boston widow who, he was told, was 'the mother of 5 sons who have died gloriously on the field of battle'. 'i pray that our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, he wrote her, and leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and lost, and the solemn pride that must be yours, to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom'. now he returned to that theme, promising '[to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan'.
with soaring eloquence l concluded his address: 'with malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; ...to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations'.
after immense applause, l turned to chief justice chase, and, laying his right hand on an open page of the bible, repeated after him the oath of office, ending with an emphatic 'so help me God!' he then kissed the bible and, as a salvo of artillery boomed and the crowd cheered, he began his second term.
except for copperhead journals like the chicago times, which denounced the speech as 'so slop shod, so loose-joined, so puerile' that 'by the side of it, mediocrity is superb', most newspapers gave l's second inaugural address a respectful if somewhat puzzled reception. in general english editors praise it more highly than did the americans. but the washington national intelligencer felt the president's final words, 'equally distinguished for patriotism, statesmanship and benevolence', deserved ' be printed in gold'.
l was not troubled that his address was not immediately popular. he recognized that ' men are not flattered by being shown that there has been a difference of purpose between the Almighty and them;. but he was pleased when it received praise. he positively beamed when frederick douglass, who was in the throng at the white house reception after the inauguration pronounced it 'a sacred effort'. as l told thurlow weed, he expected it 'to wear as well as-perhaps better than-anything i have produced'. 'lots of wisdom in that document, i suspect,' as he filed away his manuscript.
7.8.2012 LINCOLN ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL
(approaching the election of 1864) 'i cannot run the political machine, lincoln was quoted as saying during the campaign; i have enough on my hands without THAT. it is the PEOPLE'S business'. he did not take part in any of the hundreds of campaign marches and torchlight processions staged by the national union (republican) party throughout the north. he was not involved in the work of the loyal publication societies, headed by francis lieber in new york and by john murray forbes in boston, which distributed more than half a million union pamphlets bearing titles like 'no party now but all for our country'. he did nothing to encourage partisan newspapers that attacked the democrats as copperheads or charged that they were engaged in a 'peace party plot!' (indeed, he discounted tales of copperhead conspiracies as puerile (childishly foolish)
nor did l take public notice of the attacks democrats made on him during the campaign. he did not comment on democratic rallies where partisans carried banners reading TIME TO SWAP HORSES, NOVEMBER 8TH or NO MORE VULGAR JOKES. he probably never saw scurrilous democratic pamphlets, like the Lincoln catechism, wherein the eccentricities & beauties of despotism are fully set forth, which called him 'abraham africanus the first' and quoted the first of the president's own ten commandments:
'thou shalt have no other God but the negro'. the repeated democratic charge that he and the republicans favored intermarriage of blacks and whites l acknowledged only indirectly, joking that miscegenation was 'a democratic mode of producing good union men, and i dont propose to infringe on the patent'. he did not respond to democratic charges, raised in as respectable a journal as the new york world, that his administration was characterized by 'ignorance, incompetency, and corruption'. though he was, as mrs. l said, 'almost monomaniac on the subject of honesty', he did not refute the charge that he had helped a relative defraud the quartermaster's department in st. louis.
only once was he tempted to reply to a personal attack. democratic newspapers now revived the canard (a false or baseless, usually derogatory report, rumor etc.) that while touring the antietam battlefield in september 1862 he had asked ward lamon to sing 'a comic negro song'; they claimed that such behavior demonstrated that he was not 'fit for any office of trust, or even for decent society'. belligerently lamon attempted to refute the slander, but l, thinking it would be better simply to state the facts, wrote out his own account of how he had indeed-days after the battle and far from the soldiers' cemetery-asked lamon to sing 'a little sad song'. then he told lamon not to publish his reply, saying, 'i dislike to appear as an apologist for an act of my own which i know was right'.
l's public appearances during the campaign were rare. in june he did attend the great central sanitary fair, held in philadelphia to raise money for the sanitary commission and other groups providing for the needs of the soldiers, but he said little. 'i do not really think it is proper in my position for me to make a political speech, he told a group at the hotel continental, and...being more a politician than anything else, i am without anything to say'. when volunteer regiments, on their way home as their terms of enlistment expired, came by the white house, he thanked them for their service and said nothing more partisan than that they should 'rise up to the height of a generation of men worthy of a free government'.
nor did l take public notice of the attacks democrats made on him during the campaign. he did not comment on democratic rallies where partisans carried banners reading TIME TO SWAP HORSES, NOVEMBER 8TH or NO MORE VULGAR JOKES. he probably never saw scurrilous democratic pamphlets, like the Lincoln catechism, wherein the eccentricities & beauties of despotism are fully set forth, which called him 'abraham africanus the first' and quoted the first of the president's own ten commandments:
'thou shalt have no other God but the negro'. the repeated democratic charge that he and the republicans favored intermarriage of blacks and whites l acknowledged only indirectly, joking that miscegenation was 'a democratic mode of producing good union men, and i dont propose to infringe on the patent'. he did not respond to democratic charges, raised in as respectable a journal as the new york world, that his administration was characterized by 'ignorance, incompetency, and corruption'. though he was, as mrs. l said, 'almost monomaniac on the subject of honesty', he did not refute the charge that he had helped a relative defraud the quartermaster's department in st. louis.
only once was he tempted to reply to a personal attack. democratic newspapers now revived the canard (a false or baseless, usually derogatory report, rumor etc.) that while touring the antietam battlefield in september 1862 he had asked ward lamon to sing 'a comic negro song'; they claimed that such behavior demonstrated that he was not 'fit for any office of trust, or even for decent society'. belligerently lamon attempted to refute the slander, but l, thinking it would be better simply to state the facts, wrote out his own account of how he had indeed-days after the battle and far from the soldiers' cemetery-asked lamon to sing 'a little sad song'. then he told lamon not to publish his reply, saying, 'i dislike to appear as an apologist for an act of my own which i know was right'.
l's public appearances during the campaign were rare. in june he did attend the great central sanitary fair, held in philadelphia to raise money for the sanitary commission and other groups providing for the needs of the soldiers, but he said little. 'i do not really think it is proper in my position for me to make a political speech, he told a group at the hotel continental, and...being more a politician than anything else, i am without anything to say'. when volunteer regiments, on their way home as their terms of enlistment expired, came by the white house, he thanked them for their service and said nothing more partisan than that they should 'rise up to the height of a generation of men worthy of a free government'.
Saturday, July 7, 2012
7.7.2012 AM I OIKTIRMONES?
in luke 6.35f Jesus commands His disciples,
LOVE ye your enemies and DO GOOD and LEND, hoping for nothing again; and
your reward shall be great and
ye shall be the children of the Highest;
for He is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil.
BE ye therefore MERCIFUL,
as your Father also is merciful.
i can get my mind around the concepts of doing good and lending. these are things that in the conceit (excessively favorable opinion of one's own ability) of my heart i think i can actually do on my own without God's help but when it comes to merciful...it is far beyond even my conceit and i am made to know i need God...that there is absolutely no way i can even attempt to be merciful from the heart. i'm so sick of putting on masks...trying to send 'signals' to people so they will say to themselves, 'my, how merciful the boy is!'. i'm sick of garbage religion in place of the inner reality of Jesus coming directly to the hearts of others. my flesh screams for recognition, but the spirit is so thirsty for the reality of known within and genuinely flowing out.
the normal word for 'mercy' in the new testament is the greek, eleos, translated 'mercy, pity,compassion'. but here Jesus commands me as His disciple to be oiktirmones as God the Father is oiktirmones.
eleos is related to such hebrew words in the old testament as:
-kopher-the price of a life, ransom (word used in 'the mercy seat' which was in the holy of holies)
-racham-compassion (a feeling of deep sympathy and sorrow for another who is stricken by misfortune, accompanied by a strong desire to alleviate the suffering)
-chasad-to be good, kind (II samuel 15.20) (note: hope these scriptures are correct..did not check)
-chanan-show favor, be gracious (job 9.15; daniel 4.27)
-chamal-to spare (job 16.13; isaiah 63.9)
looking at these hebrew words, all but kopher pretty well match the new testament understanding of eleos..except kopher. kopher gives 'the heart' of, the source of 'mercy'. someone totally innocent has to die for someone totally guilty. their blood has to be shed and that shed blood covers the sin of the guilty one.
but oiktirmones, i don't think...has any related hebrew words to help understand it. it seems though that eleos is more related to
LOVE ye your enemies and DO GOOD and LEND, hoping for nothing again; and
your reward shall be great and
ye shall be the children of the Highest;
for He is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil.
BE ye therefore MERCIFUL,
as your Father also is merciful.
i can get my mind around the concepts of doing good and lending. these are things that in the conceit (excessively favorable opinion of one's own ability) of my heart i think i can actually do on my own without God's help but when it comes to merciful...it is far beyond even my conceit and i am made to know i need God...that there is absolutely no way i can even attempt to be merciful from the heart. i'm so sick of putting on masks...trying to send 'signals' to people so they will say to themselves, 'my, how merciful the boy is!'. i'm sick of garbage religion in place of the inner reality of Jesus coming directly to the hearts of others. my flesh screams for recognition, but the spirit is so thirsty for the reality of known within and genuinely flowing out.
the normal word for 'mercy' in the new testament is the greek, eleos, translated 'mercy, pity,compassion'. but here Jesus commands me as His disciple to be oiktirmones as God the Father is oiktirmones.
eleos is related to such hebrew words in the old testament as:
-kopher-the price of a life, ransom (word used in 'the mercy seat' which was in the holy of holies)
-racham-compassion (a feeling of deep sympathy and sorrow for another who is stricken by misfortune, accompanied by a strong desire to alleviate the suffering)
-chasad-to be good, kind (II samuel 15.20) (note: hope these scriptures are correct..did not check)
-chanan-show favor, be gracious (job 9.15; daniel 4.27)
-chamal-to spare (job 16.13; isaiah 63.9)
looking at these hebrew words, all but kopher pretty well match the new testament understanding of eleos..except kopher. kopher gives 'the heart' of, the source of 'mercy'. someone totally innocent has to die for someone totally guilty. their blood has to be shed and that shed blood covers the sin of the guilty one.
but oiktirmones, i don't think...has any related hebrew words to help understand it. it seems though that eleos is more related to
Friday, July 6, 2012
7.6.2012 LINCOLN: PRINCIPLE OR POLITICS II
lincoln was more troubled by the effect that his 'to whom it may concern' letter had on the conservative elements of his following. it hit the war democrats hardest. charles d. robinson, democratic editor of the green bay (wisconsin) advocate, best expressed their views. up to now, despite sharp criticism from other democrats, he had sustained the president's war policy as the only method of putting down the rebellion. he had even accepted the emancipation proclamation, because he believed that depriving the confederacy of its laborers weakened the rebels. but now, he lamented in a letter to l, the requirement of the abandonment of slavery as a condition for peace talks 'puts the whole war question on a new basis, and takes us war democrats clear off our feet, leaving us no ground to stand upon'.
recognizing that robinson spoke for large numbers of war democrats. whose support for the national union ticket was central to his reelection strategy, l felt compelled to draft a reply. HAD HE FAILED TO INSIST ON ABOLITION AS A CONDITION FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, he explained, HE WOULD BE GUILTY OF TREACHERY TO THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS WHO HAD 'COME BODILY OVER FROM THE REBEL SIDE TO OURS.' such a betrayal could not escape the curses of heaven, or of any good man'. apart from the moral issue, there was the practical consideration that without 'the physical force which the colored people now give, and promise us,...neither the present nor any coming administration, can save the union'.
but recognizing the genuineness of robinson's concerns, the president also sought to soften his policy. 'saying re-union and abandonment of slavery would be considered, if offered, is not saying that nothing else or less would be considered, if offered, is not saying that nothing else or less would be considered, if offered,' he suggested. 'if jeff davis wishes ..to know what i would do if he were to offer peace and re-union, saying nothing about slavery, let him try me.'
the president's apparent willingness to modify his peace terms in order to hold the allegiance of the war democrats was echoed the next day in the new york times: 'mr. l did say that he would receive and consider propositions for peace,...if they embraced the integrity of the union and the abandonment of slavery. but he did not say that he would not receive them unless they embraced both these conditions'.
l decided to hold his letter to robinson until he could discuss its contents with former governor alexander w. randall and judge joseph t. mills, both, like robinson, from wisconsin. as he talked to them, his impatience with the war democrats became increasingly evident. if they really wanted to end the war without interfering with slavery, 'the field was open to them to have enlisted and put down this rebellion by force of arms...long before the present policy was inaugurated'. but now, if he followed their advice, he would have to do without the help of nearly 200,000 black men in the service of the union. in that case 'we would be compelled to abandon the war in 3 weeks'. practical considerations aside, there was the moral issue. how could anybody propose 'to return to slavery the black warriors of port hudson and olustee to their masters to conciliate the south'? 'i should be damned in time and in eternity for so doing', he told his visitors. 'THE WORLD SHALL KNOW THAT I WILL KEEP MY FAITH TO FRIENDS AND ENEMIES, COME WHAT WILL.'
that same afternoon l tried his letter out on frederick douglass, the great african-american spokesman whom he considered 'one of the most meritorious men in america'. when douglass heard that the president would be willing to consider a peace plan that did not include abolition, his eyes flashed in anger and he strongly objected to the letter. 'it would be given a broader meaning than you intend to convey, he warned. it would be taken as a complete surrender of your antislavery policy, and do you serious damage'.
touched by douglass's earnestness and, no doubt, affected by his own eloquence in the interview with randall and mills, l put aside the letter to robinson and never sent it. in effect, HE GAVE UP ON WILLING THE SUPPORT OF THE WAR DEMOCRATS, most of whom quietly returned to their allegiance to the democratic party in the fall elections.
even more serious was the erosion of the president's support among conservative republicans. these moderates did not form a cohesive group, either in the congress or in the country, and their opinions on issues like emancipation and reconstruction covered a broad range. most recognized that the end of slavery was inevitable but were distressed that l had now chosen to make abolition a necessary condition for peace negotiations. claiming to speak for 'the great body of the respectable part of the country', the new york merchant prince william e. dodge wanted a peace that 'would be honorable to the north and so liberal to the south as to give the lie to the assertion that the north hated them and wished to destroy them'.
l's peace terms suggested that he was 'so fully committed to the entire abolition of slavery as a condition of peace that he will use all the power of the government to continue the war till either the south is destroyed or they consent to give up the slaves'. many of the moderates were sure that the president's policy would strengthen the confederate will to resist; more were troubled because the president's policy opened them to attack as abolitionists, miscegenationists, and amalgamationists.
had the war been moving toward a rapid conclusion, most of these fears could have been allayed, but in the late summer of 1864 disaster continued to follow disaster. on july 30, after weeks of inactivity, grant tried to break the defenses of petersburg by exploding a huge mine under the confederate line; 15,000 union troops rushed int the crater produced by the explosion, but they were poorly led by drunken or incompetent officers and within hours 4,000 men were killed or wounded and the rest had to be withdrawn. even before this fiasco, as losses in both the army of the potomac and in sherman's army continued to mount, l had felt obliged to call for 500,000 more soldiers; if by september there were not enough volunteers, he would resort to a draft. this time the draft was going to hit comfortable, middle-class families, because congress had recently abolished the provision that had allowed a man to 'commute' his military service by paying $300. almost simultaneously, as the costs of the war grew steadily, secretary of the treasury fessenden had to announce a new $200,000,000 loan, and the credit of the government was now so poor that he had difficulty finking purchasers.
faced with all these problems, moderate republicans rarely broke with the president, but they gave his reelection campaign only tepid support. in the cabinet itself attorney general bates saw no alternative to l but felt that the country lacked direction and 'that our great want was a competent man at the head of affairs,...a competent leader'. orville browning (note: one of the very few personal friends the president had) felt even more alienated, and he wrote a fellow moderate: 'you know, strange as it may seem to you, that i am personally attached to the president, and have faithfully tried to uphold him, and make him respectabele; tho' i never have been able to persuade myself that he was big enough for his position. still, i thought he might get through, as many a boy through college, without degrace, and without knowledge; and i fear he is a failure'.
in new york disaffection among moderates posed a special problem for l because their leader, thurlow weed, was more critical of the president than ever. the new york boss was convinced that l went too far in making abolition a condition for peace negotiations. 'as things now stand mr. l's re-election is and impossibility, he concluded. the People are wild for peace, he explained to seward. they are told that the president will only listen to terms of peace on condition (that) slavery be abandoned'.
'i am fearful our hold upon mr weed is slight, wrote abram wakeman, the new york postmaster, who was one of l's staunchest supporters. he evidently has his eye upon some other probable candidate'. weed was indeed flirting with the democrates. though he said he would zealously support l if the democrats nominated a peace man, he publicly offered his voice and vote to any presidential nominee who took as his platform the crittenden resolution of 1861, which declared that the sole object of the war was the preservation of the union.
as usual, weed's disenchantment with the administration stemmed not merely from l's policies but from his distribution of the patronage and public funds in new york. chase's protege, hiram barney, remained collector in the all-important customs house, though a moderate complained 'that he is a perfect negative man, and possesses no knowledge of politics in any shape and makes no pretensions (sic) to such knowledge'. rufus f. andrews, the surveyor, was 'a political adventurer from the start', who failed to support the regular nominees of the republican party. (note: it seems that part of lincoln's wisdom....'in a multitude of counselors there is wisdom'... was keeping people of other political viewpoints in many positions so the government would 'look something like' the country that elected it...a policy not often followed) other moderates alerted the president that there must be 'an immediate change in the offices of the collector and surveyor of the port of new york'.
'the tide is setting strongly against us', henry j. raymond, chairman of the national union executive committee, warned the president on aug. 22. raymond had heard from wahburne that illinois would go democratic, from cameron that pennsylvania would be against l, and from governor morton that 'nothing but the most strenuous efforts can carry indiana'. he himself predicted that new york would give the democratic candidate a majority of 50,000 votes. some voters were complaining of the want of military successes; others voiced 'fear and suspicion...that we are not, to have peace in any event under this administration until slavery is abandoned'. 'nothing but the most resolute and decided action on the part of the government and its friends, he told l, can save the country from falling into hostile hands'.
this message confirmed l's own pessimistic appraisal of the situation. ' you think i don't know i am going to be beaten, he said to a friend, but i do and unless some great change takes place badly beaten'. on aug 23, with raymond's letter before him, he drafted and signed a memorandum: 'this morning, as for some days past, IT SEEMS EXCEEDINGLY PROBABLE THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT BE RE-ELECTED. then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the president elect, as to save the union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that this administration will not be re-elected. THEN IT WILL BE NY DUTY TO SO CO-OPERATE WITH THE PRESIDENT ELECT, AS TO SAVE THE UNION BETWEEN THE ELECTION AND THE INAUGURATION; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards'.
l's language revealed not merely his pessimism about his own fortunes but his realistic understanding of the forces that opposed his reelection. he did not say that if he was defeated the country would fall into the hands of copperheads who would consent to the division of the union and the recognition of the confederacy. he did not think the democrats were disloyal. there had been 'much impugning of motives, and much heated controversy as to the proper means and best mode of advancing the union cause', he conceded, but he derived great satisfaction in recording that 'a great majority of the opposing party' was as firmly committed as the republicans to maintaining the integrity of the union, and he noted with pride that 'no candidate for office whatever, high or low, has ventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up the union'. nor did he have doubts about the loyalty of george b. meClellan, whose nomination by the democrats he anticipated. but he did think that if the democrats elected mcClellan the party platform would force the new administration to seek an armistice, which virtually assured confederate independence.
folding and sealing his memorandum carefully, so that none of the text was visible, l put it aside until the next cabinet meeting, when he asked each member to sign his name on the back of the document. as he explained later, his purpose was to talk with mcClellan, whose election he thought probable, saying: GENERAL, THE ELECTION HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT YOU ARE STRONGER, HAVE MORE INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAN I. NOW LET US TOGETHER, YOU WITH YOUR INFLUENCE AND I WITH ALL THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT, TRY TO SAVE THE COUNTRY.' he had little hope that mcClellan would do anything, but, he added, AT LEAST ...I SHOULD HAVE DONE MY DUTY AND HAVE STOOD CLEAR BEFORE MY OWN CONSCIENCE'.
recognizing that robinson spoke for large numbers of war democrats. whose support for the national union ticket was central to his reelection strategy, l felt compelled to draft a reply. HAD HE FAILED TO INSIST ON ABOLITION AS A CONDITION FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, he explained, HE WOULD BE GUILTY OF TREACHERY TO THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS WHO HAD 'COME BODILY OVER FROM THE REBEL SIDE TO OURS.' such a betrayal could not escape the curses of heaven, or of any good man'. apart from the moral issue, there was the practical consideration that without 'the physical force which the colored people now give, and promise us,...neither the present nor any coming administration, can save the union'.
but recognizing the genuineness of robinson's concerns, the president also sought to soften his policy. 'saying re-union and abandonment of slavery would be considered, if offered, is not saying that nothing else or less would be considered, if offered, is not saying that nothing else or less would be considered, if offered,' he suggested. 'if jeff davis wishes ..to know what i would do if he were to offer peace and re-union, saying nothing about slavery, let him try me.'
the president's apparent willingness to modify his peace terms in order to hold the allegiance of the war democrats was echoed the next day in the new york times: 'mr. l did say that he would receive and consider propositions for peace,...if they embraced the integrity of the union and the abandonment of slavery. but he did not say that he would not receive them unless they embraced both these conditions'.
l decided to hold his letter to robinson until he could discuss its contents with former governor alexander w. randall and judge joseph t. mills, both, like robinson, from wisconsin. as he talked to them, his impatience with the war democrats became increasingly evident. if they really wanted to end the war without interfering with slavery, 'the field was open to them to have enlisted and put down this rebellion by force of arms...long before the present policy was inaugurated'. but now, if he followed their advice, he would have to do without the help of nearly 200,000 black men in the service of the union. in that case 'we would be compelled to abandon the war in 3 weeks'. practical considerations aside, there was the moral issue. how could anybody propose 'to return to slavery the black warriors of port hudson and olustee to their masters to conciliate the south'? 'i should be damned in time and in eternity for so doing', he told his visitors. 'THE WORLD SHALL KNOW THAT I WILL KEEP MY FAITH TO FRIENDS AND ENEMIES, COME WHAT WILL.'
that same afternoon l tried his letter out on frederick douglass, the great african-american spokesman whom he considered 'one of the most meritorious men in america'. when douglass heard that the president would be willing to consider a peace plan that did not include abolition, his eyes flashed in anger and he strongly objected to the letter. 'it would be given a broader meaning than you intend to convey, he warned. it would be taken as a complete surrender of your antislavery policy, and do you serious damage'.
touched by douglass's earnestness and, no doubt, affected by his own eloquence in the interview with randall and mills, l put aside the letter to robinson and never sent it. in effect, HE GAVE UP ON WILLING THE SUPPORT OF THE WAR DEMOCRATS, most of whom quietly returned to their allegiance to the democratic party in the fall elections.
even more serious was the erosion of the president's support among conservative republicans. these moderates did not form a cohesive group, either in the congress or in the country, and their opinions on issues like emancipation and reconstruction covered a broad range. most recognized that the end of slavery was inevitable but were distressed that l had now chosen to make abolition a necessary condition for peace negotiations. claiming to speak for 'the great body of the respectable part of the country', the new york merchant prince william e. dodge wanted a peace that 'would be honorable to the north and so liberal to the south as to give the lie to the assertion that the north hated them and wished to destroy them'.
l's peace terms suggested that he was 'so fully committed to the entire abolition of slavery as a condition of peace that he will use all the power of the government to continue the war till either the south is destroyed or they consent to give up the slaves'. many of the moderates were sure that the president's policy would strengthen the confederate will to resist; more were troubled because the president's policy opened them to attack as abolitionists, miscegenationists, and amalgamationists.
had the war been moving toward a rapid conclusion, most of these fears could have been allayed, but in the late summer of 1864 disaster continued to follow disaster. on july 30, after weeks of inactivity, grant tried to break the defenses of petersburg by exploding a huge mine under the confederate line; 15,000 union troops rushed int the crater produced by the explosion, but they were poorly led by drunken or incompetent officers and within hours 4,000 men were killed or wounded and the rest had to be withdrawn. even before this fiasco, as losses in both the army of the potomac and in sherman's army continued to mount, l had felt obliged to call for 500,000 more soldiers; if by september there were not enough volunteers, he would resort to a draft. this time the draft was going to hit comfortable, middle-class families, because congress had recently abolished the provision that had allowed a man to 'commute' his military service by paying $300. almost simultaneously, as the costs of the war grew steadily, secretary of the treasury fessenden had to announce a new $200,000,000 loan, and the credit of the government was now so poor that he had difficulty finking purchasers.
faced with all these problems, moderate republicans rarely broke with the president, but they gave his reelection campaign only tepid support. in the cabinet itself attorney general bates saw no alternative to l but felt that the country lacked direction and 'that our great want was a competent man at the head of affairs,...a competent leader'. orville browning (note: one of the very few personal friends the president had) felt even more alienated, and he wrote a fellow moderate: 'you know, strange as it may seem to you, that i am personally attached to the president, and have faithfully tried to uphold him, and make him respectabele; tho' i never have been able to persuade myself that he was big enough for his position. still, i thought he might get through, as many a boy through college, without degrace, and without knowledge; and i fear he is a failure'.
in new york disaffection among moderates posed a special problem for l because their leader, thurlow weed, was more critical of the president than ever. the new york boss was convinced that l went too far in making abolition a condition for peace negotiations. 'as things now stand mr. l's re-election is and impossibility, he concluded. the People are wild for peace, he explained to seward. they are told that the president will only listen to terms of peace on condition (that) slavery be abandoned'.
'i am fearful our hold upon mr weed is slight, wrote abram wakeman, the new york postmaster, who was one of l's staunchest supporters. he evidently has his eye upon some other probable candidate'. weed was indeed flirting with the democrates. though he said he would zealously support l if the democrats nominated a peace man, he publicly offered his voice and vote to any presidential nominee who took as his platform the crittenden resolution of 1861, which declared that the sole object of the war was the preservation of the union.
as usual, weed's disenchantment with the administration stemmed not merely from l's policies but from his distribution of the patronage and public funds in new york. chase's protege, hiram barney, remained collector in the all-important customs house, though a moderate complained 'that he is a perfect negative man, and possesses no knowledge of politics in any shape and makes no pretensions (sic) to such knowledge'. rufus f. andrews, the surveyor, was 'a political adventurer from the start', who failed to support the regular nominees of the republican party. (note: it seems that part of lincoln's wisdom....'in a multitude of counselors there is wisdom'... was keeping people of other political viewpoints in many positions so the government would 'look something like' the country that elected it...a policy not often followed) other moderates alerted the president that there must be 'an immediate change in the offices of the collector and surveyor of the port of new york'.
'the tide is setting strongly against us', henry j. raymond, chairman of the national union executive committee, warned the president on aug. 22. raymond had heard from wahburne that illinois would go democratic, from cameron that pennsylvania would be against l, and from governor morton that 'nothing but the most strenuous efforts can carry indiana'. he himself predicted that new york would give the democratic candidate a majority of 50,000 votes. some voters were complaining of the want of military successes; others voiced 'fear and suspicion...that we are not, to have peace in any event under this administration until slavery is abandoned'. 'nothing but the most resolute and decided action on the part of the government and its friends, he told l, can save the country from falling into hostile hands'.
this message confirmed l's own pessimistic appraisal of the situation. ' you think i don't know i am going to be beaten, he said to a friend, but i do and unless some great change takes place badly beaten'. on aug 23, with raymond's letter before him, he drafted and signed a memorandum: 'this morning, as for some days past, IT SEEMS EXCEEDINGLY PROBABLE THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT BE RE-ELECTED. then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the president elect, as to save the union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that this administration will not be re-elected. THEN IT WILL BE NY DUTY TO SO CO-OPERATE WITH THE PRESIDENT ELECT, AS TO SAVE THE UNION BETWEEN THE ELECTION AND THE INAUGURATION; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards'.
l's language revealed not merely his pessimism about his own fortunes but his realistic understanding of the forces that opposed his reelection. he did not say that if he was defeated the country would fall into the hands of copperheads who would consent to the division of the union and the recognition of the confederacy. he did not think the democrats were disloyal. there had been 'much impugning of motives, and much heated controversy as to the proper means and best mode of advancing the union cause', he conceded, but he derived great satisfaction in recording that 'a great majority of the opposing party' was as firmly committed as the republicans to maintaining the integrity of the union, and he noted with pride that 'no candidate for office whatever, high or low, has ventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up the union'. nor did he have doubts about the loyalty of george b. meClellan, whose nomination by the democrats he anticipated. but he did think that if the democrats elected mcClellan the party platform would force the new administration to seek an armistice, which virtually assured confederate independence.
folding and sealing his memorandum carefully, so that none of the text was visible, l put it aside until the next cabinet meeting, when he asked each member to sign his name on the back of the document. as he explained later, his purpose was to talk with mcClellan, whose election he thought probable, saying: GENERAL, THE ELECTION HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT YOU ARE STRONGER, HAVE MORE INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAN I. NOW LET US TOGETHER, YOU WITH YOUR INFLUENCE AND I WITH ALL THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT, TRY TO SAVE THE COUNTRY.' he had little hope that mcClellan would do anything, but, he added, AT LEAST ...I SHOULD HAVE DONE MY DUTY AND HAVE STOOD CLEAR BEFORE MY OWN CONSCIENCE'.
Thursday, July 5, 2012
7.5.2012 LINCOLN: PRINCIPLE OR POLITICS? I
it was not only grant who tried l's patience during these unusually hot, depressing summer months of 1864. usually he was ready to spend countless hours listening to visitors who brought him their complaints and petitions, sometimes over quite trivial matters, but now he had had enough. when two citizens of maine asked him to intervene to settle a personal problem, the president sharply responded: you want me to end your suspense? i'll do so. dont let me hear another word about your case'. a few days later his anger erupted again when charles gibson resigned as solicitor in the court of claims, protesting the radicalism of the republican platform but expressing gratitude to the president for treating him with 'personal kindness and consideration'. with what bates called 'blind impetuosity' l lashed back that there were '2 small draw-backs upon mr. gibson's right to still receive such treatment, one of which is that he never could learn of his giving much attention to the duties of his office, and the other is this studied attempt of mr. gibson's to stab him'.
in calmer times l would have ignored a semi literate communication form a pennsylvania man who urged him to remember that 'white men is in class number one and black men is in class number two and must be governed by white men forever'. but now, in his irascible mood, he drafted a reply to be sent out over nicolay's signature requesting the writer to inform him 'whether you are either a white man or black one, because in either case, you cannot be regarded as an entirely impartial judge'. 'it may be, the president continued, in an unusual tone of sarcasm, that you belong to a third or fourth class of yellow or red men, in which case the impartiality of your judgment would be more apparant'.
l's sharp temper extended at times even to his closest advisers. montgomery blair, furious because early's (note: a general from the south) men had burned his house in silver spring, denounced the 'poltroons and cowards' responsible for the defenses of washington. halleck, always defensive of professional military men, demanded that the president either endorse 'such wholesale denouncement and accusation' or dismiss blair. l replied that he did not approve the postmaster general's remarks but that his words, which 'may have been hastily said in a moment of vexation at so severe a loss', were not sufficient grounds for removing him. 'i propose continuing to be myself the judge as to when a member of the cabinet shall be dismissed', he said sternly, and he took the unusual step of reading to the entire cabinet a carefully prepared memorandum; 'i must myself be the judge, how long to retain in, and when to remove any of you from, his position. it would greatly pain me to discover any of you endeavoring to procure anothers removal, or, in any way to prejudice him before the public. such endeavor would be a wrong to me; and much worse, a wrong to the country'.
on the more important issue of possible peace negotiations with the confederates, the president was obliged to control his anger. indeed, he gained a certain sardonic (characterized by bitter or scornful derision) from his skillful handling of the question. the prime mover was the erratic and excitable editor of the new york tribune. just as early's men were approaching the capital, greeley wrote l that his 'irrepressible friend' william c. jewett was certain that representatives of the confederate government were on the canadian side of niagara falls with full authority to negotiate a peace. greeley urged the president to explore the possibility, because the country was in such desperate shape. a full and generous announcement of union conditions for ending the war, even if they were not accepted,would remover the 'wide-spread conviction that the government and its prominent supporters are not anxious for peace' and help the republican cause in the fall elections.
correctly l suspected a trap. he could not know why the three confederate emissaries-former mississippi congressman jacob thompson, former alabama senator clement c. clay, and professor james p. holcombe of the university of virginia-were in canada, but his instincts told him that their purpose was not to make peace but to meddle in northern politics with a view to influencing the presidential election.
he could not reject the proposed negotiations outright, even though he thought greeley unreliable and mendacious. but this chosen intermediary of the confederates had the power to shape northern opinion. the new york tribune, widely distributed in the west as well as in the east, boasted the largest national circulation of any newspaper. the editor's letter, which reminded the president 'how intently the people desire any peace consistent with the national integrity and honor' and that an offer of fair terms would 'prove an immense and sorely needed advantage to the national cause', thinly masked a threat to go public in case l turned down this opportunity. if the tribune portrayed the president as flatly rejecting a reasonable peace negotiation, it could do irreparable damage.
shrewdly l solved his problem by naming greeley himself as his emissary to the confederates at niagara and authorizing him to bring to washington under safe conduct 'any person anywhere professing to have any proposition of jefferson davis in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the union and abandonment of slavery'. greeley objected. for all his countrified looks and his shuffling gait, the editor was no fool, and he was unwilling to become 'a confidant, far less an agent in such negotiations'. but the president refused to let him off the hook. 'i not only intend a sincere effort for peace, he wrote greeley, but i intend that you shall be a personal witness that it is made'. when greeley continued to delay, the president expressed disappointment: 'i was not expecting you to send me a letter, but to bring me a man, or men'. he then ordered john hay to accompany greeley to niagara falls, bearing a letter that spelled out the terms on which he was willing to deal with the confederate emissaries.
l himself drafted the letter, consulting only seward. addressed 'to whom it may concern', it read: 'any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole union, and the abandonment of slavery...will be received and considered by the executive government of the united states'. it also offered safe-conduct to the confederate negotiators and 'liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points.'
the letter reflected l's careful balancing of political considerations against military needs. he could best promote his chances in the fall election by requiring only minimal conditions for beginning negotiations with the confederates. if he announced that reunification of the nation was the sole condition for peace, he would cement the alliance that he had been trying for months to build with the war democrats, who loyally supported his efforts to restore the union, even though many of them had reservations about his emancipation policy. if, as he anticipated, jefferson davis rejected this reasonable, lenient offer, these democrats could more easily favor the reelection of a republican president.
but there was an unacceptable military risk in this approach. conceivably the confederates might accept reunion as a condition for discussing peace. if they did, they could propose a cease-fire during the progress of any negotiations, and l knew that the people were so war-weary and exhausted that it would be almost impossible to resume hostilities once arms were laid down. 'an armistice-a cessation of hostilities-is the end of the struggle, and the insurgents would be in peaceable possession of all that has been struggled for'.
consequently he had to appear open to peace negotiations while proposing terms that would make them impossible. the first of his conditions, the restoration of the union, was easy to predict; that was what the war, from the outset, had been about. but the second, requiring 'the abandonment of slavery' as a condition for peace talks, was a surprise. it went considerably beyond his own emancipation proclamation or any law of congress. the emancipation proclamation had freed slaves only in specified areas and had not ended the institution of slavery itself, and congress had just failed to adopt the 13th amendment outlawing slavery. this condition was one l knew the confederates would never accept.
l expected that the confederate emissaries would spurn his offer. when they rushed to print his 'to whom it may concern' letter, in order to show that he had torpedoed meaningful peace talks, he countered by publicizing the report he had just received from james r. gilmore and james f. jaquess, who had recently conducted their own unofficial peace mission to richmond. there jeff davis told them: the war...must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks,...unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. we are not fighting for slavery. we are fighting for independence,-and that, or extermination, we will have'. (note: with the failure of this objective the legal foundation of the american revolution (ie. a group of SOVEREIGN states deciding to unite, giving up..BUT NOT PERMANENTLY..their rights to act in ways varient to the other states IF NEED BE...)ended.) reasonable people could only conclude that neither president wanted serious peace negotiations.
the new york herald announced that publication of the president's 'to whom it may concern' letter 'sealed l's fate in the coming presidential campaign'. by making abolition as much a war aim as union, the president gave new strength to the democratic party, preparing for its national convention in chicago at the end of august. opposition leaders declared that letter proved l did not really want to end the war 'even if an honorable peace were within his grasp'. 'all he has a right to require of the south is submission to the constitution', democratic editors announced. they were sure that 'the people of the loyal states will teach him, they will not supply men and treasure to prosecute a war in the interest of the black race'.
the president's letter also undermined his support in his own party. at first, oddly enough, the erosion was most noticeable among the radicals. greeley's animus toward the president increased after his venture into amateur diplomacy became a subject of ridicule. he was not alone. radicals, who should have been pleased by the president's firm insistence on abolition, felt they had lincoln on the run, and they began to express all their pent-up grievances and frustrations at the president's slowness, his timidity, his indecisiveness, his fence-straddling, his incompetence, his leniency toward the rebels. chase, though ostensibly out of politics, spent much of the summer in new england conferring with other anti-l republicans and spreading the news that there was 'great and almost universal dissatisfaction with mr. l among all earnest men'. in boston he frequently conferred with sumner, who grumbled that the country needed 'a president with brains; one who can make a plan and carry it out'. pomeroy, the original head of the chase movement, and wade, coauthor of the reconstruction bill l had just vetoed, joined them for a conference, which, as a newspaper correspondent shrewdly surmised, 'boded no good to Father Abraham'. radical disaffection was not confined to new england. in iowa, grimes concluded: 'this entire administration has been a disgrace from the very beginning to every one who had any thing to do with bringing it into power. i take my full share of the ...shame to myself. i can atone for what i have done no otherwise than in refusing to be instrumental in continuing it'.
on august 5 this dissatisfaction with l exploded with the publication of a protest by wade and henry winter davis against l's 'grave executive usurpation' in pocket-vetoing their reconstruction bill. the congressmen found the president's public message explaining the reasons for his action even more offensive than the veto. 'a more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated',', they fumed; it was a 'blow at the friends of his administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles of republican government'. l must know that 'the authority of congress is paramount and must be respected...; and if he wishes our support, he must confine himself to his executive duties-to obey and execute, not make the laws'.
publication of the wade-davis 'manifesto', as it was generally called, produced a short-lived political commotion. democrats, of course, enjoyed the spectacle of prominent congressional leaders attacking the presidential nominee of their own party, and they congratulated 'the country that two republicans have been found willing at last to resent the encroachments of the executive on the authority of congress'. the manifesto, according to the new york world, was 'a blow between the eyes which will daze the president'. the new york herald, always glad to jab at the administration, called it an acknowledgment that l was 'an egregious failure' who ought 'to retire from the position to which, in an evil hour, he was exalted'. but the rhetoric of the proclamation was so excessive and the accusations against l so extreme that the charges backfired. most republican papers criticized wade and davis more severely than they did the president.
l did not read the manifesto. he had no desire to get involved in a controversy with its authors, he told welles. the attack saddened him and he admitted to noah brooks, 'to be wounded in the house of one's friends' is perhaps the most grievous affliction that can befall a man'. but he refused to brood about it. 'it is not worth fretting about, he joked; it reminds me of an old acquaintance, who, having a son of a scientific turn, bought him a microscope. the boy went around, experimenting with his glass upon everything...one day, at the dinner-table, his father took up a piece of cheese. 'con't eat that, father, said the boy; it is full of wrigglers'. 'my son, replied the old gentleman, taking...a huge bite, let 'em wriggle; i can stand it if they can'.'
less public, but more dangerous to the president, was a radical plan to replace l, already the official nominee of his party, with another candidate who would be more positive and energetic, who would be more deeply committed to equal rights, and who would, presumably, have a greater chance of success. little groups of radicals in boston, cincinnati, and, especially, new york concocted plans for summoning a new republican nominating convention. some of the schemers favored chase; others, butler. few looked to fremont, whose candidacy was already failing and they tried to get him to withdraw from the race on the condition that l did so. most put their hopes on grant.
in a preliminary meeting on august 18, about 25 radicals gathered at the house of mayor george opdyke of new york. the editors of the major newspapers-greeley of the tribune, parke godwin of the evening post, theodore tilton of the independent, and george wildes of the spirit of the times-were present, as were wade, davis, and governor john a. andrew of massachusetts. chase sent his regrets, hoping that the deliberations would be 'fruitful, of the benefit to our country, never more in need of wise words and fearless action by and among patriotic men'. sumner too stayed away. 'i do not as yet see the presidential horizon', he explained. i wait for the blue lights of (the democratic convention at) chicago, which will present the true outlines'. those who did attend-the diarist george templeton strong termed them 'our wire-pullers and secret, unofficial governors'- decided to send out a circular letter calling for a new convention, to be held at cincinnati on sept. 28, which would 'concentrate the union strength on some one candidate who commands the confidence of the country, even by a new nomination if necessary'. less politely davis said that the convention was intended 'to get rid of mr lincoln and name new candidates'. to make final arrangements they promised to meet again on aug. 30.
inevitably reports of these plans reached l's ears. he was neither surprised nor worried by most of the schemes to replace him as the nominee of the republican party, but he was alarmed when he heard that the dissidents were thinking of running grant. he did not think the general had political aspirations but, concluding that he ought to sound him out again, he asked colonel john eaton, who had worked closely with grant in caring for the freedmen in the mississippi valley, to go to the army of the potomac and ascertain his views. at city point, eaton told grant that many people thought he ought to run for president, not as a party man but as a citizens' candidate, in order to save the union. bringing his hand down on the arm of his chair, grant replied: 'they can't do it! they can't compel me to do it!' he went on to say that he considered it 'as important for the cause that (l) should be elected as that the army should be successful in the field'. when eaton reported the conversation to the president, his relief was obvious. 'i told you, he said, they could not get him to run until he had closed out the rebellion'.
in calmer times l would have ignored a semi literate communication form a pennsylvania man who urged him to remember that 'white men is in class number one and black men is in class number two and must be governed by white men forever'. but now, in his irascible mood, he drafted a reply to be sent out over nicolay's signature requesting the writer to inform him 'whether you are either a white man or black one, because in either case, you cannot be regarded as an entirely impartial judge'. 'it may be, the president continued, in an unusual tone of sarcasm, that you belong to a third or fourth class of yellow or red men, in which case the impartiality of your judgment would be more apparant'.
l's sharp temper extended at times even to his closest advisers. montgomery blair, furious because early's (note: a general from the south) men had burned his house in silver spring, denounced the 'poltroons and cowards' responsible for the defenses of washington. halleck, always defensive of professional military men, demanded that the president either endorse 'such wholesale denouncement and accusation' or dismiss blair. l replied that he did not approve the postmaster general's remarks but that his words, which 'may have been hastily said in a moment of vexation at so severe a loss', were not sufficient grounds for removing him. 'i propose continuing to be myself the judge as to when a member of the cabinet shall be dismissed', he said sternly, and he took the unusual step of reading to the entire cabinet a carefully prepared memorandum; 'i must myself be the judge, how long to retain in, and when to remove any of you from, his position. it would greatly pain me to discover any of you endeavoring to procure anothers removal, or, in any way to prejudice him before the public. such endeavor would be a wrong to me; and much worse, a wrong to the country'.
on the more important issue of possible peace negotiations with the confederates, the president was obliged to control his anger. indeed, he gained a certain sardonic (characterized by bitter or scornful derision) from his skillful handling of the question. the prime mover was the erratic and excitable editor of the new york tribune. just as early's men were approaching the capital, greeley wrote l that his 'irrepressible friend' william c. jewett was certain that representatives of the confederate government were on the canadian side of niagara falls with full authority to negotiate a peace. greeley urged the president to explore the possibility, because the country was in such desperate shape. a full and generous announcement of union conditions for ending the war, even if they were not accepted,would remover the 'wide-spread conviction that the government and its prominent supporters are not anxious for peace' and help the republican cause in the fall elections.
correctly l suspected a trap. he could not know why the three confederate emissaries-former mississippi congressman jacob thompson, former alabama senator clement c. clay, and professor james p. holcombe of the university of virginia-were in canada, but his instincts told him that their purpose was not to make peace but to meddle in northern politics with a view to influencing the presidential election.
he could not reject the proposed negotiations outright, even though he thought greeley unreliable and mendacious. but this chosen intermediary of the confederates had the power to shape northern opinion. the new york tribune, widely distributed in the west as well as in the east, boasted the largest national circulation of any newspaper. the editor's letter, which reminded the president 'how intently the people desire any peace consistent with the national integrity and honor' and that an offer of fair terms would 'prove an immense and sorely needed advantage to the national cause', thinly masked a threat to go public in case l turned down this opportunity. if the tribune portrayed the president as flatly rejecting a reasonable peace negotiation, it could do irreparable damage.
shrewdly l solved his problem by naming greeley himself as his emissary to the confederates at niagara and authorizing him to bring to washington under safe conduct 'any person anywhere professing to have any proposition of jefferson davis in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the union and abandonment of slavery'. greeley objected. for all his countrified looks and his shuffling gait, the editor was no fool, and he was unwilling to become 'a confidant, far less an agent in such negotiations'. but the president refused to let him off the hook. 'i not only intend a sincere effort for peace, he wrote greeley, but i intend that you shall be a personal witness that it is made'. when greeley continued to delay, the president expressed disappointment: 'i was not expecting you to send me a letter, but to bring me a man, or men'. he then ordered john hay to accompany greeley to niagara falls, bearing a letter that spelled out the terms on which he was willing to deal with the confederate emissaries.
l himself drafted the letter, consulting only seward. addressed 'to whom it may concern', it read: 'any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole union, and the abandonment of slavery...will be received and considered by the executive government of the united states'. it also offered safe-conduct to the confederate negotiators and 'liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points.'
the letter reflected l's careful balancing of political considerations against military needs. he could best promote his chances in the fall election by requiring only minimal conditions for beginning negotiations with the confederates. if he announced that reunification of the nation was the sole condition for peace, he would cement the alliance that he had been trying for months to build with the war democrats, who loyally supported his efforts to restore the union, even though many of them had reservations about his emancipation policy. if, as he anticipated, jefferson davis rejected this reasonable, lenient offer, these democrats could more easily favor the reelection of a republican president.
but there was an unacceptable military risk in this approach. conceivably the confederates might accept reunion as a condition for discussing peace. if they did, they could propose a cease-fire during the progress of any negotiations, and l knew that the people were so war-weary and exhausted that it would be almost impossible to resume hostilities once arms were laid down. 'an armistice-a cessation of hostilities-is the end of the struggle, and the insurgents would be in peaceable possession of all that has been struggled for'.
consequently he had to appear open to peace negotiations while proposing terms that would make them impossible. the first of his conditions, the restoration of the union, was easy to predict; that was what the war, from the outset, had been about. but the second, requiring 'the abandonment of slavery' as a condition for peace talks, was a surprise. it went considerably beyond his own emancipation proclamation or any law of congress. the emancipation proclamation had freed slaves only in specified areas and had not ended the institution of slavery itself, and congress had just failed to adopt the 13th amendment outlawing slavery. this condition was one l knew the confederates would never accept.
l expected that the confederate emissaries would spurn his offer. when they rushed to print his 'to whom it may concern' letter, in order to show that he had torpedoed meaningful peace talks, he countered by publicizing the report he had just received from james r. gilmore and james f. jaquess, who had recently conducted their own unofficial peace mission to richmond. there jeff davis told them: the war...must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks,...unless you acknowledge our right to self-government. we are not fighting for slavery. we are fighting for independence,-and that, or extermination, we will have'. (note: with the failure of this objective the legal foundation of the american revolution (ie. a group of SOVEREIGN states deciding to unite, giving up..BUT NOT PERMANENTLY..their rights to act in ways varient to the other states IF NEED BE...)ended.) reasonable people could only conclude that neither president wanted serious peace negotiations.
the new york herald announced that publication of the president's 'to whom it may concern' letter 'sealed l's fate in the coming presidential campaign'. by making abolition as much a war aim as union, the president gave new strength to the democratic party, preparing for its national convention in chicago at the end of august. opposition leaders declared that letter proved l did not really want to end the war 'even if an honorable peace were within his grasp'. 'all he has a right to require of the south is submission to the constitution', democratic editors announced. they were sure that 'the people of the loyal states will teach him, they will not supply men and treasure to prosecute a war in the interest of the black race'.
the president's letter also undermined his support in his own party. at first, oddly enough, the erosion was most noticeable among the radicals. greeley's animus toward the president increased after his venture into amateur diplomacy became a subject of ridicule. he was not alone. radicals, who should have been pleased by the president's firm insistence on abolition, felt they had lincoln on the run, and they began to express all their pent-up grievances and frustrations at the president's slowness, his timidity, his indecisiveness, his fence-straddling, his incompetence, his leniency toward the rebels. chase, though ostensibly out of politics, spent much of the summer in new england conferring with other anti-l republicans and spreading the news that there was 'great and almost universal dissatisfaction with mr. l among all earnest men'. in boston he frequently conferred with sumner, who grumbled that the country needed 'a president with brains; one who can make a plan and carry it out'. pomeroy, the original head of the chase movement, and wade, coauthor of the reconstruction bill l had just vetoed, joined them for a conference, which, as a newspaper correspondent shrewdly surmised, 'boded no good to Father Abraham'. radical disaffection was not confined to new england. in iowa, grimes concluded: 'this entire administration has been a disgrace from the very beginning to every one who had any thing to do with bringing it into power. i take my full share of the ...shame to myself. i can atone for what i have done no otherwise than in refusing to be instrumental in continuing it'.
on august 5 this dissatisfaction with l exploded with the publication of a protest by wade and henry winter davis against l's 'grave executive usurpation' in pocket-vetoing their reconstruction bill. the congressmen found the president's public message explaining the reasons for his action even more offensive than the veto. 'a more studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated',', they fumed; it was a 'blow at the friends of his administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles of republican government'. l must know that 'the authority of congress is paramount and must be respected...; and if he wishes our support, he must confine himself to his executive duties-to obey and execute, not make the laws'.
publication of the wade-davis 'manifesto', as it was generally called, produced a short-lived political commotion. democrats, of course, enjoyed the spectacle of prominent congressional leaders attacking the presidential nominee of their own party, and they congratulated 'the country that two republicans have been found willing at last to resent the encroachments of the executive on the authority of congress'. the manifesto, according to the new york world, was 'a blow between the eyes which will daze the president'. the new york herald, always glad to jab at the administration, called it an acknowledgment that l was 'an egregious failure' who ought 'to retire from the position to which, in an evil hour, he was exalted'. but the rhetoric of the proclamation was so excessive and the accusations against l so extreme that the charges backfired. most republican papers criticized wade and davis more severely than they did the president.
l did not read the manifesto. he had no desire to get involved in a controversy with its authors, he told welles. the attack saddened him and he admitted to noah brooks, 'to be wounded in the house of one's friends' is perhaps the most grievous affliction that can befall a man'. but he refused to brood about it. 'it is not worth fretting about, he joked; it reminds me of an old acquaintance, who, having a son of a scientific turn, bought him a microscope. the boy went around, experimenting with his glass upon everything...one day, at the dinner-table, his father took up a piece of cheese. 'con't eat that, father, said the boy; it is full of wrigglers'. 'my son, replied the old gentleman, taking...a huge bite, let 'em wriggle; i can stand it if they can'.'
less public, but more dangerous to the president, was a radical plan to replace l, already the official nominee of his party, with another candidate who would be more positive and energetic, who would be more deeply committed to equal rights, and who would, presumably, have a greater chance of success. little groups of radicals in boston, cincinnati, and, especially, new york concocted plans for summoning a new republican nominating convention. some of the schemers favored chase; others, butler. few looked to fremont, whose candidacy was already failing and they tried to get him to withdraw from the race on the condition that l did so. most put their hopes on grant.
in a preliminary meeting on august 18, about 25 radicals gathered at the house of mayor george opdyke of new york. the editors of the major newspapers-greeley of the tribune, parke godwin of the evening post, theodore tilton of the independent, and george wildes of the spirit of the times-were present, as were wade, davis, and governor john a. andrew of massachusetts. chase sent his regrets, hoping that the deliberations would be 'fruitful, of the benefit to our country, never more in need of wise words and fearless action by and among patriotic men'. sumner too stayed away. 'i do not as yet see the presidential horizon', he explained. i wait for the blue lights of (the democratic convention at) chicago, which will present the true outlines'. those who did attend-the diarist george templeton strong termed them 'our wire-pullers and secret, unofficial governors'- decided to send out a circular letter calling for a new convention, to be held at cincinnati on sept. 28, which would 'concentrate the union strength on some one candidate who commands the confidence of the country, even by a new nomination if necessary'. less politely davis said that the convention was intended 'to get rid of mr lincoln and name new candidates'. to make final arrangements they promised to meet again on aug. 30.
inevitably reports of these plans reached l's ears. he was neither surprised nor worried by most of the schemes to replace him as the nominee of the republican party, but he was alarmed when he heard that the dissidents were thinking of running grant. he did not think the general had political aspirations but, concluding that he ought to sound him out again, he asked colonel john eaton, who had worked closely with grant in caring for the freedmen in the mississippi valley, to go to the army of the potomac and ascertain his views. at city point, eaton told grant that many people thought he ought to run for president, not as a party man but as a citizens' candidate, in order to save the union. bringing his hand down on the arm of his chair, grant replied: 'they can't do it! they can't compel me to do it!' he went on to say that he considered it 'as important for the cause that (l) should be elected as that the army should be successful in the field'. when eaton reported the conversation to the president, his relief was obvious. 'i told you, he said, they could not get him to run until he had closed out the rebellion'.
7.5.2012 LINCOLN: HOW EASY TO JUDGE..HOW GOOD NOT TO
under the enormous strain of worry about 2 armies poised for decisive battle, the president's health began to suffer. he had a nightmare about tad, who had accompanied his mother on a shopping trip to philadelphia. his 'ugly deram' feature the pistol he had permitted the boy to have-'big enough to snap caps- but no cartridges or powder'-and he wired mary; 'think you better put tad's pistol away'. a visitor found the president's face told a story of anxiety and weariness, noting 'the drooping eyelids, looking almost swollen; the dark bags beneath the eyes; the deep marks about the large and expressive mouth'. (note: l at this time was nearly beside himself due to the almost complete lack of military success by the north now more than two years into the civil war...)
then, on july 4, finally came the news that l had so long awaited. staying close to the telegraph office in the war department, he learned of a great and bloody battle that had been fought during the three previous days at gettysburg, pennsylavaia. though details were lacking, it appeared that lee had been defeated and was retreating. jubilantly the president issued a press release from the war department announcing this 'great success to the cause of the union' and urging 'that on this day, He whose will, not ours. should ever be done, be everywhere remembered and reverenced with profoundest gratitude'. three days later secretary welles received a dispatch from admiral david dixon porter announcing the fall of vicksburg and rushed to the white house with the news. his face beaming with joy, l cought welles's hand and, throwing his arm around him, exclaimed; 'what can we do for the secretary of the navy for this glorious intelligence;...i cannot, in words, tell you my joy over this result. it is great, mr. welles, it is great!'
...in the east, meade had to fight just one more battle to destroy lee's army, which was trapped between the advancing army of the potomac and the potomac river, swollen with summer rains.
but meade did not advance swiftly and, after a council of war with his senior generals, postponed an attack. lee escaped into virginia. never was l so disappointed and so FURIOUS:
-'if i had gone up there, i could have whipped them myself..
-our army held the war in the hollow of their hand and they would not close it...'
-l took special offense at a dispatch of meade's praising his army for 'driving the invader from our soil'..
-l insisted, 'the whole country is our soil..
-he feared that meade's purpose was not to defeat lee but 'to get the enemy across the river again without a further collision'.
-his anger did not fade quickly.
-weeks later he expressed deep mortification that lee's army had not been destroyed.
-'meade and his army had expended their skill and toil and blood up to the ripe harvest, he grieved, and then allowed it to go to waste'.
-from the depths of his unhappiness he wrote a bitter letter to meade, expressing gratitude for his 'magnificent usccess' at gettysburg but lamenting:
-''my dear general, i do not beleive you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in lee's escape. he was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. as it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely...your golden opportunity is gone, and i am distressed immeasurably because of it'.
-then..characteristically, he did not sign or send the letter.
AS HE COOLED DOWN, he came to recognize that
-he was EXPECTING TOO MUCH of meade.
-at the time the battle of gettysburg began, meade had been in command of the army of the potomac for only 4 days
-and he was working with new and untried subordinates.
-his army had suffered enormous losses during the three days of battle
-and some of its ablest and most aggressive generals were dead or wounded.
-meade himself was exhausted. as he wrote his wife on july 8..
-'now over 10 days, i
have not changed my clothes
have not had a regular night's rest
and many nights not a wink of sleep
and for several days did not even wash my face and hands
no regular food
and all the time in a great state of mental anxiety....
-it was asking too much of him to attack robert e. lee.
l withheld his letter-though he permitted halleck to wire that the escape of lee's army had 'created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the president'. meade promptly submitted his resignation, and halleck was forced to backtrack, saying that his telegram'was not intended as a cnsure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit'.
by this time l had recovered his equanimity and could speak of meade 'as a brave and skillful officer, and a true man', who was responsible for the success at gettysburg. indeed the president's spirits were so high that he composed a doggerel (comic or burlesque, usually loose or irregular in measure), 'Gen. Lees invasion of the North written by himself', which he gave to john hay:
in eighteen sixty three, with pomp,
and mighty swell,
Me and Jeff's Confederacy, went
forth to sack Phil-del,
the Yankees they got arter us, and
giv us particular hell, and we skedaddled back again,
and didn't sack Phil-del.
then, on july 4, finally came the news that l had so long awaited. staying close to the telegraph office in the war department, he learned of a great and bloody battle that had been fought during the three previous days at gettysburg, pennsylavaia. though details were lacking, it appeared that lee had been defeated and was retreating. jubilantly the president issued a press release from the war department announcing this 'great success to the cause of the union' and urging 'that on this day, He whose will, not ours. should ever be done, be everywhere remembered and reverenced with profoundest gratitude'. three days later secretary welles received a dispatch from admiral david dixon porter announcing the fall of vicksburg and rushed to the white house with the news. his face beaming with joy, l cought welles's hand and, throwing his arm around him, exclaimed; 'what can we do for the secretary of the navy for this glorious intelligence;...i cannot, in words, tell you my joy over this result. it is great, mr. welles, it is great!'
...in the east, meade had to fight just one more battle to destroy lee's army, which was trapped between the advancing army of the potomac and the potomac river, swollen with summer rains.
but meade did not advance swiftly and, after a council of war with his senior generals, postponed an attack. lee escaped into virginia. never was l so disappointed and so FURIOUS:
-'if i had gone up there, i could have whipped them myself..
-our army held the war in the hollow of their hand and they would not close it...'
-l took special offense at a dispatch of meade's praising his army for 'driving the invader from our soil'..
-l insisted, 'the whole country is our soil..
-he feared that meade's purpose was not to defeat lee but 'to get the enemy across the river again without a further collision'.
-his anger did not fade quickly.
-weeks later he expressed deep mortification that lee's army had not been destroyed.
-'meade and his army had expended their skill and toil and blood up to the ripe harvest, he grieved, and then allowed it to go to waste'.
-from the depths of his unhappiness he wrote a bitter letter to meade, expressing gratitude for his 'magnificent usccess' at gettysburg but lamenting:
-''my dear general, i do not beleive you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in lee's escape. he was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. as it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely...your golden opportunity is gone, and i am distressed immeasurably because of it'.
-then..characteristically, he did not sign or send the letter.
AS HE COOLED DOWN, he came to recognize that
-he was EXPECTING TOO MUCH of meade.
-at the time the battle of gettysburg began, meade had been in command of the army of the potomac for only 4 days
-and he was working with new and untried subordinates.
-his army had suffered enormous losses during the three days of battle
-and some of its ablest and most aggressive generals were dead or wounded.
-meade himself was exhausted. as he wrote his wife on july 8..
-'now over 10 days, i
have not changed my clothes
have not had a regular night's rest
and many nights not a wink of sleep
and for several days did not even wash my face and hands
no regular food
and all the time in a great state of mental anxiety....
-it was asking too much of him to attack robert e. lee.
l withheld his letter-though he permitted halleck to wire that the escape of lee's army had 'created great dissatisfaction in the mind of the president'. meade promptly submitted his resignation, and halleck was forced to backtrack, saying that his telegram'was not intended as a cnsure, but as a stimulus to an active pursuit'.
by this time l had recovered his equanimity and could speak of meade 'as a brave and skillful officer, and a true man', who was responsible for the success at gettysburg. indeed the president's spirits were so high that he composed a doggerel (comic or burlesque, usually loose or irregular in measure), 'Gen. Lees invasion of the North written by himself', which he gave to john hay:
in eighteen sixty three, with pomp,
and mighty swell,
Me and Jeff's Confederacy, went
forth to sack Phil-del,
the Yankees they got arter us, and
giv us particular hell, and we skedaddled back again,
and didn't sack Phil-del.
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