7.6.2012 LINCOLN: PRINCIPLE OR POLITICS II

lincoln was more troubled by the effect that his 'to whom it may concern' letter had on the conservative elements of his following. it hit the war democrats hardest. charles d. robinson, democratic editor of the green bay (wisconsin) advocate, best expressed their views. up to now, despite sharp criticism from other democrats, he had sustained the president's war policy as the only method of putting down the rebellion. he had even accepted the emancipation proclamation, because he believed that depriving the confederacy of its laborers weakened the rebels. but now, he lamented in a letter to l, the requirement of the abandonment of slavery as a condition for peace talks 'puts the whole war question on a new basis, and takes us war democrats clear off our feet, leaving us no ground to stand upon'.

recognizing that robinson spoke for large numbers of war democrats. whose support for the national union ticket was central to his reelection strategy, l felt compelled to draft a reply. HAD HE FAILED TO INSIST ON ABOLITION AS A CONDITION FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, he explained, HE WOULD BE GUILTY OF TREACHERY TO THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS WHO HAD 'COME BODILY OVER FROM THE REBEL SIDE TO OURS.' such a betrayal could not escape the curses of heaven, or of any good man'. apart from the moral issue, there was the practical consideration that without 'the physical force which the colored people now give, and promise us,...neither the present nor any coming administration, can save the union'.

but recognizing the genuineness of robinson's concerns, the president also sought to soften his policy. 'saying re-union and abandonment of slavery would be considered, if offered, is not saying that nothing else or less would be considered, if offered, is not saying that nothing else or less would be considered, if offered,' he suggested. 'if jeff davis wishes ..to know what i would do  if he were to offer peace and re-union, saying nothing about slavery, let him try me.'

the president's apparent willingness to modify his peace terms in order to hold the allegiance of the war democrats was echoed the next day in the new york times: 'mr. l did say that he would receive and consider propositions for peace,...if they embraced the integrity of the union and the abandonment of slavery. but he did not say that he would not receive them unless they embraced both these conditions'.

l decided to hold his letter to robinson until he could discuss its contents with former governor alexander w. randall and judge joseph t. mills, both, like robinson, from wisconsin. as he talked to them, his impatience with the war democrats became increasingly evident. if they really wanted to end the war without interfering with slavery, 'the field was open to them to have enlisted and put down this rebellion by force of arms...long before the present policy was inaugurated'.  but now, if he followed their advice, he would have to do without the help of nearly 200,000 black men in the service of the union. in that case 'we would be compelled to abandon the war in 3 weeks'. practical considerations aside, there was the moral issue. how could anybody propose 'to return to slavery the black warriors of port hudson and olustee to their masters to conciliate the south'? 'i should be damned in time and in eternity for so doing', he told his visitors. 'THE WORLD SHALL KNOW THAT I WILL KEEP MY FAITH TO FRIENDS AND ENEMIES, COME WHAT WILL.'

that same afternoon l tried his letter out on frederick douglass, the great african-american spokesman whom he considered 'one of the most meritorious men in america'. when douglass heard that the president would be willing to consider a peace plan that did not include abolition, his eyes flashed in anger and he strongly objected to the letter. 'it would be given a broader meaning than you intend to convey, he warned. it would be taken as a complete surrender of your antislavery policy, and do you serious damage'.

touched by douglass's earnestness and, no doubt, affected by his own eloquence in the interview with randall and mills, l put aside the letter to robinson and never sent it. in effect, HE GAVE UP ON WILLING THE SUPPORT OF THE WAR DEMOCRATS, most of whom quietly returned to their allegiance to the democratic party in the fall elections.

even more serious was the erosion of the president's support among conservative republicans. these moderates did not form a cohesive group, either in the congress or in the country, and their opinions on issues like emancipation and reconstruction covered a broad range. most recognized that the end of slavery was inevitable but were distressed that l had now chosen to make abolition a necessary condition for peace negotiations. claiming to speak for 'the great body of the respectable part of the country', the new york merchant prince william e. dodge wanted a peace that 'would be honorable to the north and so liberal to the south as to give the lie to the assertion that the north hated them and wished to destroy them'.
l's peace terms suggested that he was 'so fully committed to the entire abolition of slavery as a condition of peace that he will use all the power of the government to continue the war till either the south is destroyed or they consent to give up the slaves'. many of the moderates were sure that the president's policy would strengthen the confederate will to resist; more were troubled because the president's policy opened them to attack as abolitionists, miscegenationists, and amalgamationists.

had the war been moving toward a rapid conclusion, most of these fears could have been allayed, but in the late summer of 1864 disaster continued to follow disaster. on july 30, after weeks of inactivity, grant tried to break the defenses of petersburg by exploding a huge mine under the confederate line; 15,000 union troops rushed int the crater produced by the explosion, but they were poorly led by drunken or incompetent officers and within hours 4,000 men were killed or wounded and the rest had to be withdrawn. even before this fiasco, as losses in both the army of the potomac and in sherman's army continued to mount, l had felt obliged to call for 500,000 more soldiers; if by september there were not enough volunteers, he would resort to a draft. this time the draft was going to hit comfortable, middle-class families, because congress had recently abolished the provision that had allowed a man to 'commute' his military service by paying $300. almost simultaneously, as the costs of the war grew steadily, secretary of the treasury fessenden had to announce a new $200,000,000 loan, and the credit of the government was now so poor that he had difficulty finking purchasers.

faced with all these problems, moderate republicans rarely broke with the president, but they gave his reelection campaign only tepid support. in the cabinet itself attorney general bates saw no alternative to l but felt that the country lacked direction and 'that our great want was a competent man at the head of affairs,...a competent leader'. orville browning (note: one of the very few personal friends the president had) felt even more alienated, and he wrote a fellow moderate:  'you know, strange as it may seem to you, that i am personally attached to the president, and have faithfully tried to uphold him, and make him respectabele; tho' i never have been able to persuade myself that he was big enough for his position. still, i thought he might get through, as many a boy through college, without degrace, and without knowledge; and i fear he is a failure'.

in new york disaffection among moderates posed a special problem for l because their leader, thurlow weed, was more critical of the president than ever. the new york boss was convinced that l went too far in making abolition a condition for peace negotiations. 'as things now stand mr. l's re-election is and impossibility, he concluded. the People are wild for peace, he explained to seward. they are told that the president will only listen to terms of peace on condition (that) slavery be abandoned'.

'i am fearful our hold upon mr weed is slight, wrote abram wakeman, the new york postmaster, who was one of l's staunchest supporters. he evidently has his eye upon some other probable candidate'. weed was indeed flirting with the democrates. though he said he would zealously support l if the democrats nominated a peace man, he publicly offered his voice and vote to any presidential nominee who took as his platform the crittenden resolution of 1861, which declared that the sole object of the war was the preservation of the union.

as usual, weed's disenchantment with the administration stemmed not merely from l's policies but from his distribution of the patronage and public funds in new york. chase's protege, hiram barney, remained collector in the all-important customs house, though a moderate complained 'that he is a perfect negative man, and possesses no knowledge of politics in any shape and makes no pretensions (sic) to such knowledge'. rufus f. andrews, the surveyor, was 'a political adventurer from the start', who failed to support the regular nominees of the republican party. (note: it seems that part of lincoln's wisdom....'in a multitude of counselors there is wisdom'... was keeping people of  other political viewpoints in many positions so the government would 'look something like' the country that elected it...a policy not often followed) other moderates  alerted the president that there must be 'an immediate change in the offices of the collector and surveyor of the port of new york'.

'the tide is setting strongly against us', henry j. raymond, chairman of the national union executive committee, warned the president on aug. 22. raymond had heard from wahburne that illinois would go democratic, from cameron that pennsylvania would be against l, and from governor morton that 'nothing but the most strenuous efforts can carry indiana'. he himself predicted that new york would give the democratic candidate a majority of 50,000 votes. some voters were complaining of the want of military successes; others voiced 'fear and suspicion...that we are not, to have peace in any event under this administration until slavery is abandoned'. 'nothing but the most resolute and decided action on the part of the government and its friends, he told l, can save the country from falling into hostile hands'.

this message confirmed l's own pessimistic appraisal of the situation. ' you think i don't know i am going to be beaten, he said to a friend, but i do and unless some great change takes place badly beaten'. on aug 23, with raymond's letter before him, he drafted and signed a memorandum: 'this morning, as for some days past, IT SEEMS EXCEEDINGLY PROBABLE THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT BE RE-ELECTED. then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the president elect, as to save the union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that this administration will not be re-elected. THEN IT WILL BE NY DUTY TO SO CO-OPERATE WITH THE PRESIDENT ELECT, AS TO SAVE THE UNION BETWEEN THE ELECTION AND THE INAUGURATION; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards'.

l's language revealed not merely his pessimism about his own fortunes but his realistic understanding of the forces that opposed his reelection. he did not say that if he was defeated the country would fall into the hands of copperheads who would consent to the division of the union and the recognition of the confederacy. he did not think the democrats were disloyal. there had been 'much impugning of motives, and much heated controversy as to the proper means and best mode of advancing the union cause', he conceded, but he derived great satisfaction in recording that 'a great majority of the opposing party' was as firmly committed as the republicans to maintaining the integrity of the union, and he noted with pride that 'no candidate for office whatever, high or low, has ventured to seek votes on the avowal that he was for giving up the union'. nor did he have doubts about the loyalty of george b. meClellan, whose nomination by the democrats he anticipated. but he did think that if the democrats elected mcClellan the party platform would force the new administration to seek an armistice, which virtually assured confederate independence.

folding and sealing his memorandum carefully, so that none of the text was visible, l put it aside until the next cabinet meeting, when he asked each member to sign his name on the back of the document. as he explained later, his purpose was to talk with mcClellan, whose election he thought probable, saying: GENERAL, THE ELECTION HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT YOU ARE STRONGER, HAVE MORE INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAN I. NOW LET US TOGETHER, YOU WITH YOUR INFLUENCE AND I WITH ALL THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT, TRY TO SAVE THE COUNTRY.' he had little hope that mcClellan would do anything, but, he added, AT LEAST ...I SHOULD HAVE DONE MY DUTY AND HAVE STOOD CLEAR BEFORE MY OWN CONSCIENCE'.